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B5 · باب أسماء صيغة الخطاب في استعمال الفقهاء · How clear a word is, literal or figurative, explicit or allusive (v1/163–200)

1. In short
2. Why it matters
3. B5.01 · الظاهر والنص والمفسر والمحكم · Clear wording comes in four grades, each firmer than the last
4. B5.02 · الخفي والمشكل والمجمل والمتشابه · Unclear wording comes in four grades; the ambiguous (mutashābih) is left to God
5. B5.03 · الحقيقة والمجاز · Both literal and figurative speech are in the Qurʾān; a figure works like the literal, even as a general word
6. B5.04 · لا يجتمع الحقيقة والمجاز · One word cannot carry its literal and figurative sense for the same thing at once
7. B5.05 · طريق الاستعارة · A word is borrowed through a link in form or in meaning; a mere cause lends its name to what follows from it, but not the reverse
8. B5.06 · المجاز خلف عن الحقيقة · Does a figure stand in for the literal in the wording, or in the ruling? Abū Ḥanīfa and his two students differ
9. B5.07 · الصريح والكناية · Explicit wording works by itself; allusive wording needs intention or a telling situation, and ḥadd penalties need explicit words
10. B5.08 · ما تترك به الحقيقة · Five things make you leave a word's literal sense
11. B5.09 · طريق معرفة الحقيقة · A word's literal sense is the one closest to why it was named, and the most informative; it is left when impossible or abandoned by custom or law

In short

• This chapter grades words by how clear they are, and asks when a word means its literal sense [Overview]. Clear words come in four rising grades, and the clearer overrides the less clear [B5.01]. A word keeps its literal sense unless something makes us leave it [B5.08]. Explicit words work alone; allusive ones need intention [B5.07].

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Why it matters

• Because the clearer word overrides, "I marry you for a month" is a temporary marriage (mutʿa), not a valid marriage [B5.01].

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B5.01 · الظاهر والنص والمفسر والمحكم · Clear wording comes in four grades, each firmer than the last

• In plain words: How clear can a word be, and does it matter? Sarakhsī names four grades. The apparent (ẓāhir) is understood on hearing, without reflection. The text (naṣṣ) is clearer, because the passage was spoken for that very point. The explained (mufassar) leaves no room for any other reading, though it could still be abrogated. The firm (muḥkam) admits neither another reading nor abrogation. The grades matter when texts conflict: the clearer overrides the less clear.
• Example: "I marry you for a month": "I marry" is a text for marriage, but "for a month" is explained wording for a temporary marriage, and the explained prevails. So it is a temporary marriage (mutʿa), not a valid marriage.
• Who disagrees: Some limit a text (naṣṣ) to the occasion it was revealed for. Sarakhsī answers that what counts is the general wording, not the particular occasion.
• In his words: "What counts is the generality of the address, not the particularity of the occasion, in our view": «فَإِن الْعبْرَة لعُمُوم الْخطاب لَا لخُصُوص السَّبَب عندنَا» (v1/164)
• Deeper: v1 B5.01

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B5.02 · الخفي والمشكل والمجمل والمتشابه · Unclear wording comes in four grades; the ambiguous (mutashābih) is left to God

• In plain words: What do you do with a word that is not clear? Sarakhsī names four grades. With the hidden (khafī), you search; with the problematic (mushkil), you reflect, then act. The unclear (mujmal) is known only from the speaker's own explanation, so you wait for it. The ambiguous (mutashābih) gives no hope of knowing its meaning: you believe in it and do not search. The Ḥanafīs stop the verse at "none knows its interpretation except God" (Q 3:7). So seeing God in the next life is known by text, but how it happens is ambiguous.
• Example: The theft verse is plain for an ordinary thief but hidden for the pickpocket, since he goes by a name of his own, not "thief". His name marks extra skill in stealing, so his hand is cut, all the more.
• Who disagrees: ⚑ For the grave-robber, Abū Yūsuf says his hand is cut too. Abū Ḥanīfa and Muḥammad say it is not, since his name marks something missing from theft: a guarded thing with an owner guarding it.
• Deeper: v1 B5.02

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B5.03 · الحقيقة والمجاز · Both literal and figurative speech are in the Qurʾān; a figure works like the literal, even as a general word

• In plain words: Does the Qurʾān use figures of speech, and do they carry rulings? The literal (ḥaqīqa) is a word used for what it was made for; the figurative (majāz) is a word borrowed for something else. Both are in God's speech. A figure does the literal's work, like a borrowed garment, and can be general too. The difference: a literal sense cannot be denied of its object, while a figure can (a grandfather is not truly a "father"). So the literal prevails unless it is abandoned.
• Example: An oath "I will not eat from this tree" covers its fruit, since eating the tree itself is abandoned. "From this sheep" covers its meat but not its milk, since eating the sheep itself is not abandoned.
• Who disagrees: Some of al-Shāfiʿī's followers say a figure cannot be general, since figures are used out of need. Sarakhsī answers that generality comes from a separate marker, such as "the", which a figure can carry, and that God uses figures, though He is not in need.
• Deeper: v1 B5.03

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B5.04 · لا يجتمع الحقيقة والمجاز · One word cannot carry its literal and figurative sense for the same thing at once

• In plain words: Can one word in one sentence mean both its literal and its figurative sense? Sarakhsī says no, not for the same thing at the same time, as a garment cannot be owned and borrowed at once. Cases that seem to combine them really follow one broad figurative meaning, "the generality of the figure". An oath not to "set foot" in a house means not to enter it, so entering riding also breaks it.
• Example: For Abū Ḥanīfa, a bequest to "the sons of so-and-so" excludes his grandsons, since the literal sons are meant, and a grandson is a "son" only figuratively.
• Who disagrees: ⚑ Some Iraqi Ḥanafīs say the two senses may combine for two different things. Sarakhsī calls this close, provided the figure does not crowd out the literal: "your mothers and daughters" (Q 4:23) also cover grandmothers and granddaughters.
• Deeper: v1 B5.04

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B5.05 · طريق الاستعارة · A word is borrowed through a link in form or in meaning; a mere cause lends its name to what follows from it, but not the reverse

• In plain words: When may a word be borrowed for a new meaning? Sarakhsī says by the Arabs' method: through a link in form or in meaning, as "lion" for a brave man. In law, a causal link counts as a link in form. An effective cause (ʿilla) and its ruling lend their names both ways. But a mere cause lends its name only to what follows from it, not the reverse. "You are free", said with intention, can divorce a wife; "you are divorced" cannot free a slave. al-Shāfiʿī allows both ways, by likeness; Sarakhsī answers that likeness must be in the defining feature.
• Example: A marriage made with the word "gift" or "sale" is valid, because ownership of a person is a cause of the right of intimacy.
• Who disagrees: al-Shāfiʿī allows only the words "marriage" and "wedding", since the Prophet's marriage by gift was a privilege for him alone (Q 33:50). Sarakhsī answers that the privilege was a lightening for him, not a new way of speaking.
• Deeper: v1 B5.05

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B5.06 · المجاز خلف عن الحقيقة · Does a figure stand in for the literal in the wording, or in the ruling? Abū Ḥanīfa and his two students differ

• In plain words: If a word has a literal sense still in use and a common figurative sense, which counts? ⚑ Abū Ḥanīfa says the literal counts whenever it can work; the figure is reached only where the literal cannot. For him a figure replaces the literal in the wording, so where it is reached it needs only a well-formed sentence. Abū Yūsuf and Muḥammad say both count, by the generality of the figure. For them a figure replaces the literal in the ruling, so the literal ruling must at least be possible.
• Example: A man says of his slave, who is older than him, "this is my son". Abū Ḥanīfa says the slave is freed, since the sentence is well formed. His two students say he is not, since the literal sense is impossible.
• Who disagrees: ⚑ The same split decides the oath "I will not drink from the Euphrates". The two students say drinking its water from a cup breaks it. Abū Ḥanīfa says it does not, since drinking straight from the river is a literal sense still in use.
• Deeper: v1 B5.06; B5.04

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B5.07 · الصريح والكناية · Explicit wording works by itself; allusive wording needs intention or a telling situation, and ḥadd penalties need explicit words

• In plain words: Does "you are divorced" need intention the way "you are separated" does? Explicit wording (ṣarīḥ) exposes its meaning and works by itself, without intention: the plain words of divorce or freeing. Allusive wording (kināya) hides its intent, so it works only with intention or circumstances that show it. The jurists' "allusive" divorce words, like "you are separated", once intended work by their own meaning, so they give a final separation.
• Example: A ḥadd penalty is never established by allusion. A confession to zinā needs explicit words, a mute person is not punished on gestures, and "you spoke truly" said to an accuser is not an accusation of zinā.
• Deeper: v1 B5.07

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B5.08 · ما تترك به الحقيقة · Five things make you leave a word's literal sense

• In plain words: When do we stop taking a word literally? Sarakhsī names five signs: custom (ṣalāt means the prayer); something in the word itself, when its meaning falls short or goes beyond; the context; the speaker; and the thing spoken about. For example, "the blind and the seeing are not equal" (Q 35:19) is only about sight, because of what it speaks of. Likewise "actions are by intentions" is not general: it is about either the ruling or the sin, and cannot mean both, so it proves nothing about validity alone.
• Example: An oath not to eat "meat" is not broken by eating fish, which lacks something of what "meat" means, but it is broken by eating pork.
• Who disagrees: ⚑ The Iraqi Ḥanafīs claim that texts forbidding things, like carrion or wine, have no general reach, since only acts can be forbidden. Sarakhsī calls this a gross error: the prohibition truly attaches to the things themselves.
• Deeper: v1 B5.08

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B5.09 · طريق معرفة الحقيقة · A word's literal sense is the one closest to why it was named, and the most informative; it is left when impossible or abandoned by custom or law

• In plain words: How do you find a word's literal sense? Look at why the thing got its name: the sense nearer to that, and more informative, has the better claim. So a general word means all it covers, not only its narrowest part; otherwise it would just repeat the specific word. The literal sense is left when it is impossible, abandoned by custom, or abandoned by law.
• Example: An oath not to drink "from this well" is broken by drinking its water from a vessel, since drinking straight from a well is abandoned by custom.
• Who disagrees: al-Shāfiʿī reads the "idle oaths" of Q 2:225 as words that slip out without intention. The Ḥanafīs read them as an oath with no possible benefit, a false oath about the past. Sarakhsī answers that the Ḥanafī reading is nearer, since a slip of the tongue has its own names.
• Deeper: v1 B5.09; B4.03

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