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B7 · باب بيان الأحكام الثابتة بظاهر النص دون القياس والرأي · What a text gives besides its plain words, and the readings Sarakhsī rejects (v1/236–277)

1. In short
2. Why it matters
3. B7.01 · العبارة والإشارة · A text gives rulings in four ways; the first two are what the passage is for and what its words point to
4. B7.02 · أمثلة الإشارة · What verses show by indication: the shortest pregnancy, the father's position, fasting and expiation
5. B7.03 · إشارة أغنوهم عن المسألة · One short ḥadīth on the ʿĪd charity indicates who pays, who receives, when, and in what
6. B7.04 · دلالة النص · A text's plain implication is known from language, not juristic reasoning, so it can establish punishments and expiations
7. B7.05 · حدود الدلالة في العقوبات · ⚑ In punishments only a complete match extends a text (Abū Ḥanīfa); his two students extend the zinā text to sodomy and "the sword" to a heavy stone
8. B7.06 · الدلالة في الصوم · The Ramaḍān expiation reaches the consenting woman and deliberate eating by implication; al-Shāfiʿī's extension to coercion and error is qiyās
9. B7.07 · دعاوى الدلالة المردودة · Expiation for deliberate killing or a false oath is not implied by the texts
10. B7.08 · المقتضى · What must be assumed for a text to work (the presupposed) has no generality
11. B7.09 · المحذوف غير المقتضى · A word dropped for brevity is not the presupposed; "you are divorced" cannot carry an intention of three
12. B7.10 · احتمال التخصيص · The presupposed and the implied meaning cannot be narrowed; the indicated meaning can
13. B7.11 · مفهوم اللقب والعدد · Naming a thing does not deny the ruling to others, even with a number
14. B7.12 · مفهوم الصفة · A description attached to a ruling does not deny the ruling where the description is missing
15. B7.13 · مفهوم الشرط · A condition makes a ruling due when it is met; before that, nothing changes
16. B7.14 · بقاء التعليق بعد فوات المحل · ⚑ A divorce hung on a condition lapses once three divorces end the marriage
17. B7.15 · حمل المطلق على المقيد · An unqualified text and a qualified one each keep their own ruling
18. B7.16 · العام الوارد على سبب · A general answer that adds its own words is not limited to the question that prompted it
19. B7.17 · تخصيص العام بغرض المتكلم · A speaker's inferred aim does not narrow a general word
20. B7.18 · القران في النظم · Being mentioned together does not make two rulings equal
21. B7.19 · الجمع المضاف إلى جماعة · A plural attributed to a group matches one to one

In short

• This chapter asks what a text establishes besides its plain point [Overview]. A ruling can come from what the passage is for, what it points to, what it plainly implies, or what must be assumed for it to work [B7.01]. Sarakhsī then rejects reading a denial out of what a text leaves unsaid [B7.11 to B7.19].

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Why it matters

• Because a text's plain implication counts as the text itself, not as qiyās, it can establish punishments and expiations, which qiyās cannot [B7.04].

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B7.01 · العبارة والإشارة · A text gives rulings in four ways; the first two are what the passage is for and what its words point to

• In plain words: Can a verse revealed for one purpose also establish other rulings? Sarakhsī names four ways a text gives rulings. Its wording (ʿibāra) gives what the passage was brought for, which its surface plainly covers. Its indication (ishāra) gives what the passage was not brought for, but which follows from reflecting on the words, with nothing added or removed. The other two are its implied meaning (B7.04) and what it presupposes (B7.08). All four come from the text, not from qiyās, though they can differ in strength when they conflict. Because indication needs reflection, scholars differ over it, and not all of it is certain.
• Example: "For the poor emigrants" (Q 59:8) gives them, by its wording, a share of the wealth the verse divides. By its indication, the property they left in Mecca had passed out of their ownership when the unbelievers seized it. God calls them "poor", and the poor are those who own nothing, not those far from their property.
• Deeper: v1 B7.01

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B7.02 · أمثلة الإشارة · What verses show by indication: the shortest pregnancy, the father's position, fasting and expiation

• In plain words: What can a verse show beyond its main point? "His bearing and weaning are thirty months" (Q 46:15) speaks of the mother's favour. But weaning takes two years (Q 31:14), so it also shows that pregnancy lasts at least six months. Most Companions missed this; Ibn ʿAbbās saw it, and they accepted it from him. Likewise "on the one to whom the child is born" (Q 2:233) places the mother's upkeep on the father, and by indication gives the child's lineage to him.
• Example: The fasting verse allows intercourse all night (Q 2:187). By indication, one who wakes up in a state of major impurity (junub) still has a valid fast, since bathing must then come after dawn.
• Who disagrees: In the oath expiation (Q 5:89), whose wording says "feeding", al-Shāfiʿī requires giving the food into the poor man's ownership, reasoning from clothing. Sarakhsī answers that the text says "feeding", which is complete when he is let eat; clothing differs, since letting him use a garment is only a loan.
• Deeper: v1 B7.02

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B7.03 · إشارة أغنوهم عن المسألة · One short ḥadīth on the ʿĪd charity indicates who pays, who receives, when, and in what

• In plain words: How much can one short ḥadīth show? "Make them free of begging on a day like this", said of the charity at the end of Ramaḍān (ṣadaqat al-fiṭr). By its wording, the charity is due on the ʿĪd day, to the poor. By indication, it is due only on the rich, and it goes to the needy. It is best paid before going to the prayer ground, and it becomes due at dawn. Any wealth suffices, and giving it to one poor man is better. Sarakhsī says this is what the Prophet meant by "I was given comprehensive speech".
• Example: One who pays it in money has paid it, since any wealth that frees the poor man from begging suffices.
• Who disagrees: ⚑ Abū Yūsuf says it may be given only to Muslim poor. "A day like this" is the Muslims' festival, for their rich and poor alike, and the poor only have it once freed from begging. Abū Ḥanīfa and Muḥammad say that is only the preferred course, as paying before the prayer is preferred though a delay is allowed.
• Deeper: v1 B7.03

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B7.04 · دلالة النص · A text's plain implication is known from language, not juristic reasoning, so it can establish punishments and expiations

• In plain words: If a verse forbids saying "uff" to one's parents, does it also forbid beating them? Yes. A text's implied meaning (dalāla) is what its words mean in the language, not what a jurist draws out by reasoning. Anyone who knows the language grasps it, jurist or not. Qiyās differs: it infers a legal cause in order to extend a ruling to a case with no text. So, Sarakhsī says, punishments and expiations can be established by a text's implied meaning, though not by qiyās.
• Example: The ḥadd (fixed punishment) for brigandage also falls on the helper (radʾ) who backs the robbers. In the language, "waging war" means overpowering and terrifying people so that the road is cut.
• In his words: "Hence we allow punishments and expiations to be established by the text's implied meaning, although we do not allow that by qiyās": «وَلِهَذَا جَوَّزنَا إِثْبَات الْعُقُوبَات وَالْكَفَّارَات بِدلَالَة النَّص وَإِن كُنَّا لَا نجوز ذَلِك بِالْقِيَاسِ» (v1/242)
• Deeper: v1 B7.04

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B7.05 · حدود الدلالة في العقوبات · ⚑ In punishments only a complete match extends a text (Abū Ḥanīfa); his two students extend the zinā text to sodomy and "the sword" to a heavy stone

• In plain words: Does the zinā text also cover sodomy, and does "no retaliation except by the sword" also cover killing with a heavy stone? ⚑ Abū Yūsuf and Muḥammad say yes to both, by implied meaning. Sodomy has what makes zinā (lust, spilling seed, the unlawful), and a heavy object kills even more surely than a sword. Abū Ḥanīfa says no to both. In punishments only a complete match counts, since any shortfall leaves a doubt, and punishments are averted by doubt. Sodomy lacks parts of zinā's meaning: the urge from both sides, corrupting the marriage bed, and a child left, in law, with no known father to provide for it. The sword's meaning is breaking the body inside and out by wounding, which a stone or stick does not do.
• Example: For Abū Ḥanīfa, a needle wound that draws blood inside and out brings retaliation, but killing with a heavy stone does not.
• Deeper: v1 B7.05

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B7.06 · الدلالة في الصوم · The Ramaḍān expiation reaches the consenting woman and deliberate eating by implication; al-Shāfiʿī's extension to coercion and error is qiyās

• In plain words: Does the Ramaḍān expiation reach anyone besides the man who had intercourse? A Bedouin who had intercourse in Ramaḍān was told to expiate, and Sarakhsī says the expiation was for breaking the fast, not for the woman. So, by implied meaning, the woman who consents owes it too. Deliberate eating or drinking brings it as well: breaking the fast is the offence, and the pull to eat by day is even stronger. And "God fed you and gave you drink", said of one who eats forgetting, extends to one who has intercourse forgetting.
• Example: A fasting woman who consents to intercourse in Ramaḍān owes the expiation, like the man.
• Who disagrees: al-Shāfiʿī treats the coerced and the one who errs like the forgetful, since all are excused. Sarakhsī answers that this is qiyās, and a faulty one: coercion comes from another person, and error can usually be guarded against.
• Deeper: v1 B7.06

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B7.07 · دعاوى الدلالة المردودة · Expiation for deliberate killing or a false oath is not implied by the texts

• In plain words: If killing by mistake requires expiation, does killing on purpose require it too? Sarakhsī says no. Expiation is worship with a punitive side, so its cause must waver between forbidden and permitted. A mistaken killing wavers: he shot at game and hit a person. An oath about the future wavers too. Deliberate killing, and a deliberately false oath about the past (ghamūs), are purely forbidden, like zinā. And the text ties the prostration of forgetfulness to forgetting.
• Example: One who kills deliberately owes no expiation; nor does one who swears a deliberately false oath.
• Who disagrees: al-Shāfiʿī reads the killing expiation, the oath expiation and the prostration of forgetfulness as also covering the deliberate act. For him it is worse than the one the text names. Sarakhsī answers that the purely forbidden cannot be its cause.
• In his words: "So it calls for a cause that wavers between prohibition and permission": «فيستدعي سَببا مترددا بَين الْحَظْر وَالْإِبَاحَة» (v1/247)
• Deeper: v1 B7.07

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B7.08 · المقتضى · What must be assumed for a text to work (the presupposed) has no generality

• In plain words: What if a sentence only works once something unstated is assumed? That assumed part is the presupposed (muqtaḍā): an addition put first so the words make sense or take legal effect. It ranks with the implied meaning, not with qiyās, but the implied meaning wins a conflict, since it comes from language, while the presupposed comes from law, out of need. So, the Ḥanafīs hold, it has no generality: what need establishes is measured by the need.
• Example: "Free your slave on my behalf for 1,000": a sale to the asker is assumed first, so the freeing counts for him, and he owes the 1,000.
• Who disagrees: al-Shāfiʿī gives the presupposed generality, as if it were stated. So for him "if I eat", with a particular food intended, works; Sarakhsī says narrowing a word with no generality is void. ⚑ If he says "free your slave on my behalf for nothing", is it freed on the asker's behalf, as a gift to him? Abū Yūsuf says yes. Abū Ḥanīfa and Muḥammad do not, since a gift needs taking possession, an act that cannot be assumed away.
• Deeper: v1 B7.08

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B7.09 · المحذوف غير المقتضى · A word dropped for brevity is not the presupposed; "you are divorced" cannot carry an intention of three

• In plain words: Is a word dropped for brevity the same as a presupposed one? Some author treated them alike, citing "ask the town" (Q 12:82), meaning its people. Sarakhsī calls this an oversight. Dropping for brevity belongs to language, and the dropped word can be general. The presupposed belongs to law and cannot be. The test: the presupposed only completes what is stated, while a dropped word, once spelled out, carries the ruling itself.
• Example: "You are divorced", said with the intention of three, gives one divorce, since "divorced" describes her with a single quality that cannot bear number. "You are separated" (bāʾin) can carry three, since separation has two kinds, cutting ownership or cutting lawfulness, and the intention of three picks the kind that cuts lawfulness.
• Who disagrees: al-Shāfiʿī says "divorced" presupposes a divorce, which is general, so three can be intended. Sarakhsī answers that an intention works only in what the words can bear.
• Deeper: v1 B7.09

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B7.10 · احتمال التخصيص · The presupposed and the implied meaning cannot be narrowed; the indicated meaning can

• In plain words: Can each of these kinds of meaning be narrowed? The presupposed cannot, since it has no generality. The implied meaning cannot either: the text covers it in the language, so cutting part of it out would be abrogation, not narrowing. The indicated meaning can, on Sarakhsī's sounder view, since it comes from the wording, and generality belongs to wording.
• Who disagrees: ⚑ Some Ḥanafī shaykhs say the indicated meaning cannot be narrowed either, since it is extra to what the passage is for. Sarakhsī disagrees.
• In his words: "The sounder view, to me, is that it can": «وَالأَصَح عِنْدِي أَنه يحْتَمل ذَلِك» (v1/254)
• Deeper: v1 B7.10

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B7.11 · مفهوم اللقب والعدد · Naming a thing does not deny the ruling to others, even with a number

• In plain words: If a text names one thing, does it deny the ruling for everything else? Some say yes, or the naming would be pointless, and cite the Anṣār reading "water is from water" as "no bathing without emission". Sarakhsī says no; the Anṣār relied on the "the" in "the water", which marks the whole kind. In the named thing the ruling rests on the text. Elsewhere it rests on the text's legal cause (ʿilla), which jurists seek out; the text itself does not reach what it does not name. The point of naming is to let jurists look for the cause.
• Example: "Do not wrong yourselves in them" (Q 9:36), said of the four sacred months, does not make wrongdoing lawful in the other months.
• Who disagrees: al-Thaljī, as reported, said naming denies the rest only when the text also gives a number, as in "five harmful creatures". Sarakhsī rejects even that.
• In his words: "The sound view is that naming indicates that in no case": «وَالصَّحِيح أَن التَّنْصِيص لَا يدل على ذَلِك فِي شَيْء من الْمَوَاضِع» (v1/256)
• Deeper: v1 B7.11

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B7.12 · مفهوم الصفة · A description attached to a ruling does not deny the ruling where the description is missing

• In plain words: If a ruling is tied to a description, like "believing slave women" (Q 4:25), is it denied where the description is missing? The Ḥanafīs say the text makes the ruling due where the description exists. It does not deny the ruling at all where the description is absent; that case is left to other proofs. A description that affects the ruling works like a cause, and a missing cause does not deny a ruling.
• Example: Grazing animals owe zakat because grazing is the cause. Working animals owe none, but by another text, "no zakat on working animals", not by the description.
• Who disagrees: al-Shāfiʿī says a description denies the ruling where it is absent. Since the verse says "believing", there is no marriage to a slave woman of the People of the Book. He cites the grazing animals. Sarakhsī answers that the exclusion there comes from another text.
• Deeper: v1 B7.12

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B7.13 · مفهوم الشرط · A condition makes a ruling due when it is met; before that, nothing changes

• In plain words: If a ruling hangs on a condition, is it denied before the condition is met? The Ḥanafīs say the text makes the ruling due when the condition exists; before that, things stay as they were before the hanging. Sarakhsī's reason: hanging on a condition acts on the cause itself, not on its effect. Until the condition is met, the words are not yet a cause, as an arrow is not yet a killing until it reaches its target.
• Example: So paying an expiation before breaking the oath is invalid, since the oath aims at keeping it and cannot be the expiation's cause. And a man who can afford a free wife may marry a slave woman, by the general verses; by a separate rule, not on top of a free wife.
• Who disagrees: al-Shāfiʿī says a hung ruling is absent while its condition is absent, and that hanging acts on the ruling, not the cause. So for him an expiation may be paid after the oath and before breaking it, in money though not by fasting. Money, unlike a bodily act, can be owed before it is paid.
• Deeper: v1 B7.13; B13e.04

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B7.14 · بقاء التعليق بعد فوات المحل · ⚑ A divorce hung on a condition lapses once three divorces end the marriage

• In plain words: Does a hung triple divorce survive once he divorces her three times, to bite if she remarries him? ⚑ Zufar says yes, since losing the subject is like losing ownership, which does not void a hanging. That happens when he sells the slave, or separates from his wife and her waiting period ends. The Ḥanafīs say no: three divorces end her lawfulness to him, and a hanging needs a subject, both at its start and while it lasts. It is different if he names marriage explicitly ("whenever I marry you").
• Example: He says "if you enter the house, you are thrice divorced", then divorces her three times. She marries another, remarries him, and enters: no divorce falls.
• In his words: "But we say: the hanging lapses when the subject ceases to exist": «وَلَكنَّا نقُول بانعدام الْمحل يبطل التَّعْلِيق» (v1/266)
• Deeper: v1 B7.14

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B7.15 · حمل المطلق على المقيد · An unqualified text and a qualified one each keep their own ruling

• In plain words: If one text says "a slave" and another says "a believing slave", must the first be read like the second? The Ḥanafīs say no: each keeps its own ruling. Ibn ʿAbbās said to leave unrestricted what God left unrestricted. The exception is where a text restricts that very same ruling (here, discharging the oath expiation by fasting), as Ibn Masʿūd's reading does; a well-known report is enough for that.
• Example: The fast for breaking an oath must be three consecutive days. That comes from Ibn Masʿūd's reading, "three days consecutive", well known up to Abū Ḥanīfa's time. A well-known report can add to a text.
• Who disagrees: al-Shāfiʿī carries the unqualified onto the qualified, since the qualified "speaks" and the unqualified is "silent". So he requires a believing slave in the oath and ẓihār (likening one's wife to one's mother) expiations, as in the killing expiation. Sarakhsī answers that this restricts what God left unrestricted.
• In his words: "Not by carrying the unqualified onto the qualified, but by the reading of Ibn Masʿūd": «لَيْسَ بِحمْل الْمُطلق على الْمُقَيد بل بِقِرَاءَة ابْن مَسْعُود» (v1/269)
• Deeper: v1 B7.15

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B7.16 · العام الوارد على سبب · A general answer that adds its own words is not limited to the question that prompted it

• In plain words: If a general statement comes in answer to a specific question, is it limited to that question? It depends. It is limited when the occasion is reported with the ruling ("he forgot, so he prostrated"), or when the words cannot stand alone ("yes"). It is also limited when they stand alone but add nothing to the answer. Where they stand alone and add something, the Ḥanafīs say it is not limited, since limiting it would cancel the extra words. The verses on ẓihār (likening one's wife to one's mother), qadhf (accusing someone of zinā) and liʿān (mutual oaths of cursing between spouses) were not limited to their occasions.
• Example: Asked "come and lunch with me", he answers "if I lunch today, my slave is free". The oath covers any lunch that day. If he says he meant only that lunch, he is believed before God, in conscience.
• Who disagrees: Some scholars read such a statement as the answer only. Sarakhsī answers that this acts on what is unspoken and leaves what is spoken.
• Deeper: v1 B7.16

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B7.17 · تخصيص العام بغرض المتكلم · A speaker's inferred aim does not narrow a general word

• In plain words: Does a speaker's known aim, such as praising or blaming, narrow his general words? Some say yes. The Ḥanafīs say no: a general is known by its form, and once the form is there and its literal sense works, it must be acted on. That holds even in praise or blame, which Arabs also express in general terms. Weighing a merely inferred aim is weighing a bare possibility.
• In his words: "In our view this is invalid: it leaves what the form requires out of mere preference, and acts on what is silent": «وَعِنْدنَا هَذَا فَاسد لِأَنَّهُ ترك مُوجب الصِّيغَة بِمُجَرَّد التشهي وَعمل بالمسكوت» (v1/273)
• Deeper: v1 B7.17

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B7.18 · القران في النظم · Being mentioned together does not make two rulings equal

• In plain words: Does being mentioned together in one passage make two rulings equal? Some newer jurists say yes. ⚑ Some Ḥanafīs read "establish prayer and give zakat" to mean no zakat on a child, who owes no prayer. The Ḥanafīs say no: that acts on what is unspoken. "And" joining two complete sentences is style, not sharing. "And" joining an incomplete clause to a complete one shares the first clause's ruling, because the incomplete clause needs one.
• Example: Take the verse on qadhf (accusing someone of zinā), Q 24:4–5. "And do not accept their testimony" is a second order to the same rulers who are told to flog, so the rejection completes the punishment. "And those are the corrupt" is a separate report about the accusers, so "except those who repent" lifts only the label of corruption, not the rejection of their testimony.
• Who disagrees: al-Shāfiʿī reads the verse the other way round, so repentance restores the testimony too.
• Deeper: v1 B7.18

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B7.19 · الجمع المضاف إلى جماعة · A plural attributed to a group matches one to one

• In plain words: When a plural is attributed to a group, does each person get the whole plural? Some say so, citing "take from their wealth a charity" (Q 9:103). The Ḥanafīs say this form matches one to one.
• Example: He tells his two wives, "if you two bear two children, you are both divorced". Each bears one child, and both are divorced. "Cut off their hands" (Q 5:38) means one hand each.
• In his words: "But what this form requires is matching units with units": «وَلَكِن مُقْتَضى هَذِه الصِّيغَة مُقَابلَة الْآحَاد بالآحاد» (v1/276)
• Deeper: v1 B7.19

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