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B4 · باب أسماء صيغة الخطاب في تناوله المسميات · Wording by what it covers: khāṣṣ, ʿāmm, mushtarak, muʾawwal (v1/124–163)

1. B4.01 · الأسماء الأربعة · Four kinds of wording by what they cover: specific, general, equivocal, interpreted (v1/124–128)
2. B4.02 · حكم الخاص · The specific word fixes its meaning with certainty; reading a condition into it is abrogation, not explanation (v1/128–131)
3. B4.03 · العام قطعي · The general word binds with certainty in all it covers, like the specific; and, per most of our shaykhs, an unspecified general is not specified by a single report or by qiyās (v1/132–143)
4. B4.04 · العام إذا خص منه شيء · Once specified, a general remains proof for the rest but no longer certain (v1/144–151)
5. B4.05 · ألفاظ العموم · Generality comes from plurals (least three), genus nouns, and the particles man, mā, kull and jamīʿ; an indefinite is general only under negation, with the article where there is no known referent, or with a general description (v1/151–162)
6. B4.06 · حكم المشترك والمؤول · The equivocal requires suspension with belief and a search; the interpreted binds action without certainty (v1/162–163)

B4.01 · الأسماء الأربعة · Four kinds of wording by what they cover: specific, general, equivocal, interpreted (v1/124–128)

• Position: «اعْلَم بِأَن هَذِه الْأَسْمَاء أَرْبَعَة الْخَاص وَالْعَام والمشترك والمؤول» — "Know that these names are four: the specific, the general, the equivocal and the interpreted." (v1/124)
  • Khāṣṣ: «فالخاص كل لفظ مَوْضُوع لِمَعْنى مَعْلُوم على الِانْفِرَاد» (v1/124) — "the specific is every expression coined for one known meaning on its own", whether of a genus ("human"), a type ("man") or an individual ("Zayd"). (v1/124–125)
  • ʿĀmm: «وَأما الْعَام كل لفظ يَنْتَظِم جمعا من الْأَسْمَاء لفظا أَو معنى» — "the general is every expression that gathers a group of named things, by its wording or by its meaning" (e.g. plurals; man, mā). (v1/125)
  • Mushtarak: several meanings share one word "not by gathering them, but with the possibility that each one is meant alone"; once one is meant, the others are excluded (e.g. ʿayn; qurʾ). (v1/126)
  • Muʾawwal: «وَأما المؤول فَهُوَ تبين بعض مَا يحْتَمل الْمُشْتَرك بغالب الرَّأْي وَالِاجْتِهَاد» — "the interpreted is making clear one of the equivocal's possible meanings by preponderant opinion and ijtihād." (v1/127)
• Who: ⚑ al-Jaṣṣāṣ defined the ʿāmm as gathering "names or meanings". Sarakhsī calls this "an error", or a slip of expression, since al-Jaṣṣāṣ himself states that the equivocal has no generality; he says some copies of the book read "names and meanings". "Generality" of meanings is only figurative. (v1/125–126)
  • Against the Muʿtazila's "every mujtahid hits the truth": ijtihād yields preponderant opinion; whoever claims it reaches the truth with certainty falls under "whoever interprets the Qurʾān by his opinion". (v1/127)
• Furūʿ test: a bequest to "his mawlās", when he has both freers and freed, is void, since the word is equivocal and the two meanings differ (reward vs kindness). An oath "I will not speak to my mawlās" covers both, since the motive is one, so it works like a general word. (v1/126–127)
• Ranking: the ʿāmm covers more than the khāṣṣ; the khāṣṣ is firmer in its meaning than the mushtarak; the mushtarak can be resolved by reflection, unlike the mujmal. (v1/127–128)

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B4.02 · حكم الخاص · The specific word fixes its meaning with certainty; reading a condition into it is abrogation, not explanation (v1/128–131)

• Position: «حكم الْخَاص معرفَة المُرَاد بِاللَّفْظِ وَوُجُوب الْعَمَل بِهِ فِيمَا هُوَ مَوْضُوع لَهُ لُغَة» — "The ruling of the specific: knowing what the word means and the duty to act on it in what it was coined for." It may be turned to a figure by evidence, but it does not need explaining (bayān), since it is clear in itself. (v1/128)
• Furūʿ test (v1/128–129)
  • "Three qurūʾ" (Q 2:228) are menstrual periods: taking them as purities would give two and part of a third, and "three" is a specific number.
  • Rukūʿ is fulfilled by the least bowing; calm (taʿdīl) comes from a single report, so it is wājib, not farḍ.
  • Ṭawāf is circling the House; purity for it comes from a single report, so it is wājib (repeat, or a sacrifice).
  • In wuḍūʾ (Q 5:6), making intention, sequence, continuity or the basmala a condition of validity — so that ḥadath would not lift without them even though the washing and wiping occurred — would abrogate the specific text; ruling them wājib or sunna, added for completeness as a single report requires, is not the same ruling and honours both texts' rank.
  • «فَتبين أَن فِيمَا ذهب إِلَيْهِ الْخصم حط دَرَجَة النَّص عَن مرتبته أَو رفع دَرَجَة خبر الْوَاحِد فَوق مرتبته» — "So the opponent's view lowers the text below its rank, or raises the single report above its rank." (v1/129)
• Objection → Reply: al-Shāfiʿī: "In the theft verse, 'cut' is specific; making the stolen property lose its protected value (so no compensation) is your addition by opinion." Reply: it comes from another specific word in the verse, "a recompense (jazāʾ) for what they earned" (Q 5:38). A jazāʾ is due to God, so the property's protection became God's right, and a complete recompense needs an act that is unlawful in itself. (v1/129–130)
• More furūʿ (v1/130–131)
  • "Seeking [them] with your wealth" (Q 4:24): property must accompany marriage, so the unnamed dower is owed by the contract. Against the opponent (al-khaṣm), who in the tafwīḍ case says no dower is owed by the contract.
  • "We know what We imposed on them" (Q 33:50): the dower has a legal minimum, not left to the spouses.
  • ⚑ "Until she marries another husband" (Q 2:230): Muḥammad and al-Shāfiʿī say "until" marks an end, so a second husband before three divorces changes nothing. Abū Ḥanīfa and Abū Yūsuf say the verse's terminus is expressed through the second husband's marriage-contract itself — not that the verse ends that contract; the condition of consummation comes separately from the mashhūr ḥadīth of Rifāʿa's wife, which supplies the cause of renewed lawfulness; so a second marriage after one or two divorces produces a new lawfulness. (v1/130–131)
  • Divorce after khulʿ counts (the "fa" of Q 2:230 after 2:229); khulʿ is a divorce, not an annulment. (v1/131)

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B4.03 · العام قطعي · The general word binds with certainty in all it covers, like the specific; and, per most of our shaykhs, an unspecified general is not specified by a single report or by qiyās (v1/132–143)

• Position: «وَالْمذهب عندنَا أَن الْعَام مُوجب للْحكم فِيمَا يتَنَاوَلهُ قطعا بِمَنْزِلَة الْخَاص» — "Our position: the general requires the ruling in all it covers, with certainty, like the specific", whether command, prohibition or statement. The exception is where generality is impossible (no possible range of application): then it is suspended like the mujmal. (v1/132)
  • ⚑ «وَأكْثر مَشَايِخنَا يَقُولُونَ أَيْضا إِن الْعَام الَّذِي لم يثبت خصوصه بِدَلِيل لَا يجوز تَخْصِيصه بِخَبَر الْوَاحِد وَلَا بِالْقِيَاسِ» — "Most of our shaykhs also say: a general that has not been specified by evidence may not be specified by a single report or by qiyās." The text adds that they «فزعموا أَن الْمَذْهَب هَذَا» — "claimed this to be the school's position"; it names no dissenter, so the split is only implied by "most". (v1/133)
• Who (v1/132)
  • «قَالَ بعض الْمُتَأَخِّرين مِمَّن لَا سلف لَهُم فِي الْقُرُون الثَّلَاثَة» (v1/132) — "Some later people, who have no predecessors in the first three generations", the Wāqifiyya: its ruling is suspension until the meaning is shown. Some of them: the narrowest specification is certain and the rest is suspended.
  • al-Shāfiʿī: the general applies to all it covers, but with a doubt (it may be meant specifically), like qiyās. So he allows specifying it at the outset by qiyās and single reports; e.g. he preferred the ʿarāyā report over "dates for dates, measure for measure".
• Evidence from the imams' rulings (v1/132–133)
  • Muḥammad: a ring bequeathed to one person and its stone later to another (in a separate statement): the stone is shared, because the general and the specific bequest are equal. If the statements are connected, the stone goes to the second, since the end explains the beginning.
  • In muḍāraba, a later general permission overrides an earlier specific one, and the reverse.
  • Abū Ḥanīfa preferred the general "whoever digs a well has forty cubits around it" over the specific sixty for the irrigation well; "what the earth brings forth has a tenth" over "no ṣadaqa in green vegetables"; and held the specific ʿUranīyūn report abrogated by the general "avoid urine".
  • The "most of our shaykhs" rule applied: the Fātiḥa report does not specify "recite what is easy" (Q 73:20); "do not eat what God's name was not mentioned on" is not specified by a single report or qiyās (the forgetter is treated as having mentioned it); "whoever enters it is safe" (Q 3:97). (v1/133–134)
• Proofs (v1/134–137)
  1. "Follow what has been sent down to you" (Q 7:3) covers the general and the specific; suspension is not following. (v1/135)
  2. The Companions argued by general wording alone: the Prophet to Ubayy (Q 8:24); the Companions and Abū Bakr on the zakāt withholders; ʿUmar on the land of the Sawād (Q 59:10); Ibn ʿAbbās on the six-month birth; ʿAlī and ʿUthmān on two sisters by ownership; ʿAlī and Ibn Masʿūd on the pregnant widow, Ibn Masʿūd holding the later general verse abrogates the specific; Ibn ʿUmar on suckling; Ibn ʿAbbās on ṣarf. (v1/135–136) «وَلَا معنى لقَوْل من يَقُول إِنَّهُم عرفُوا ذَلِك بِدَلِيل آخر» — "there is no sense in saying they knew it by another proof", since what is reported is their arguing by the general wording alone; Abū Bakr told them "the Book of God is among you". (v1/136)
  3. Generality is an intended meaning, so it needs dedicated wording; "my slaves are free" is how one frees them all. (v1/136–137)
• Objection → Reply
  • The Wāqifiyya: «أَلا ترى أَنه يَسْتَقِيم أَن يقرن بِهِ على وَجه الْبَيَان وَالتَّفْسِير» — "one can attach to it by way of explanation [what is meant, e.g.] 'the people came, all of them (kulluhum)' or 'together (ajmaʿūn)'"; if generality were its meaning, it could not be explained by another word, as the specific cannot ("Zayd came, all of him"). (v1/134) Reply: even after "all" and "together" an exception can still be attached ("the angels prostrated, all of them together, except Iblīs", Q 15:30–31); such words do not make it general, they make it firm (muḥkam). Its generality was certain already, but not firm, since specification remained possible. (v1/137)
  • al-Shāfiʿī: the general is still open to specification, so it cannot be certain. Reply: an intention to specify is hidden. «وَلَكنَّا نقُول المُرَاد بِمُطلق الْكَلَام مَا هُوَ الْحَقِيقَة فِيهِ» (v1/137) — "We say: what unqualified speech intends is its literal sense", which holds with certainty until a figure is shown, exactly as with the specific. (v1/137–139)
  • al-Shāfiʿī's distinction: the specific's possible figure would work like abrogation (so it does not weaken it now), while specification does not lift the ruling, so it keeps the general doubtful. Reply: God has lifted hardship from us. Reading a speaker's hidden intention is great hardship, so the law puts the visible cause (the general wording) in its place, as it puts puberty for maturity, travel for hardship and new ownership for the need of istibrāʾ. «وَهَذَا أصل كَبِير فِي الْفِقْه» (v1/140) — "and this is a major principle in fiqh." (v1/139–141)
  • The visible-cause principle tested: if he says "you are divorced now if it is in God's knowledge that so-and-so will arrive by a month's end", and the man arrives once the month is complete, the divorce falls on her only at the arrival, since we had no way to be sure of God's knowledge before then. This differs from "you are divorced now if Zayd is in the house", later found true: there the divorce dates from the utterance, «لِأَنَّهُ كَانَ لنا طَرِيق إِلَى الْوُقُوف على مَا جعله شرطا حَقِيقَة» — "because we had a way to ascertain what he made the true condition" (v1/141), so its later discovery only clarifies a divorce that had already occurred. A condition beyond ordinary means of verification is treated as effective on discovery; one that ordinary means could reach is effective from the utterance once discovered.
  • A later general overrides an earlier specific: "do not free my slave Sālim", then "free the white ones among my slaves", and Sālim is white: freeing him obeys the command and breaks no prohibition. «فَكَذَلِك نقُول فِي الْعَام الْمُتَأَخر فِي خطاب الشَّرْع إِنَّه يكون قَاضِيا فِيمَا تنَاوله على الْخَاص» — "Likewise we say that a later general in the Lawgiver's address prevails over the specific in what it covers." (v1/141)
  • "But you allow specifying the general by qiyās and single reports." Reply, as most of our shaykhs chose: only a general already specified by a strong proof (a widely-transmitted report, a mashhūr, or ijmāʿ); after that, qiyās or a single report decides between the remaining possibilities. (v1/141–142)
  • "Applying the specific and the rest of the general uses both proofs." Reply: both are certain, so where they truly conflict they repel each other; "using both" is not possible. (v1/142–143)
• Where generality is impossible: "not equal are the people of the Fire and of the Garden" (Q 59:20). al-Shāfiʿī uses it for no retaliation between Muslim and non-Muslim; Sarakhsī: where generality is impossible, the general has no general force at all. (v1/143)
• [Editorial] Debate note: This is the premise behind filters 1–2 in B9d and behind the wājib category (B3.06). Note Sarakhsī's own qualification: the "no specification by single report or qiyās" rule is reported as the view of "most of our shaykhs", and applies only to a general not yet specified (B4.04).

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B4.04 · العام إذا خص منه شيء · Once specified, a general remains proof for the rest but no longer certain (v1/144–151)

• Position: «وَالصَّحِيح عِنْدِي أَن الْمَذْهَب عِنْد عُلَمَائِنَا فِي الْعَام إِذا لحقه خُصُوص يبْقى حجَّة فِيمَا وَرَاء الْمَخْصُوص سَوَاء كَانَ الْمَخْصُوص مَجْهُولا أَو مَعْلُوما إِلَّا أَن فِيهِ شُبْهَة حَتَّى لَا يكون مُوجبا قطعا ويقينا» — "The sound view with me is that our scholars' position on a general once specification reaches it: it remains proof for what lies outside the specified part, whether that part is unknown or known, but with a doubt, so that it no longer binds with certainty." (v1/144) He compares this to al-Shāfiʿī's view of the general before any specification.
• Who (v1/144)
  • ⚑ al-Karkhī (the primary edition opens an editor's bracket after the formula "qāla" here and never closes it, so the gate cannot pass a quote from this paragraph; it is paraphrased): Sarakhsī reports that al-Karkhī said, "on his own account, not relaying it from the early authorities", that a specified general is no longer proof and must be suspended until explained, whether the specification is known or unknown, except for the narrowest specification when known.
  • A second view: an unknown specification makes the rest suspended; a known one leaves the rest certain.
  • A third view: a known specification leaves the rest certain; an unknown one falls away and the general stays as it was, because the specifying evidence is a separate, self-standing statement, unconnected to the general's own wording — unlike a connected exception, which changes what the original utterance itself said. A known, unconnected specifier truly conflicts with the general at that point; an unknown one cannot, since «فالمجهول لَا يصلح مُعَارضا للمعلوم» — "so the unknown cannot oppose the known" (v1/147). So a seller who, after the sale is complete, grants the buyer an unspecified deferral of the price, not stipulated in the contract, leaves the price due at once from the buyer: the unknown deferral cannot displace what the contract, once concluded, already obligates. (v1/147–148)
• Evidence from the imams (v1/144–145): Abū Ḥanīfa argued from "he forbade a sale with a condition" and "the neighbour has more right to his adjacent [property]", both specified generals. Muḥammad argued from "he forbade selling what has not been taken possession of". Abū Ḥanīfa specified that last one by qiyās, which shows it was no longer certain.
  • Such a general ranks below the single report: qiyās cannot oppose a single report, so the Ḥanafīs followed the report on wuḍūʾ from laughing aloud in prayer, and Abū Ḥanīfa the report on wuḍūʾ with date-wine. (v1/144–145)
• Against al-Karkhī (v1/145–147): his view would drop most general texts, since most have been specified, contrary to the early generations' practice. The claim that specification makes the word figurative fails: the general covers three as truly as a thousand. (v1/146)
• The second view answers al-Karkhī that his claim that a specified general admits reasoning by cause has no sense, since the specified part is like an exception and non-existence is not reasoned from (v1/147); Sarakhsī's own view differs, since a specifying text, by its form, is a separate text open to reasoning (v1/149).
• Against the second view (v1/147): it would drop the theft verse (specified by the unknown "price of a shield"), the sale verse (by ribā) and the penalty verses (by "avert the ḥudūd by doubts").
• Why the sound view (v1/148–149): the specifying evidence is like an exception in its effect on the ruling (it shows the ruling covers only the rest, so it must be simultaneous), and like an abrogating text in its form (a separate, self-standing statement, open to reasoning by cause). Both sides are given weight: the general is still proof, but with doubt. So it may now be specified by qiyās, but a single report still outranks qiyās. (v1/149)
• Furūʿ test: selling a free man and a slave for one price is wholly void (the free man was never in the contract, so the slave is sold "at his share"). Selling two slaves when one perishes before delivery, or is claimed by another, leaves the sale valid in the other, which is like abrogation. An option (khiyār) in one of two slaves: valid only if its price is named and it is identified. Abū Ḥanīfa treats a free man and a slave sold with a price named for each differently: the sale in the slave fails, because making acceptance of the free man a condition is a void condition. (v1/149–151)

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B4.05 · ألفاظ العموم · Generality comes from plurals (least three), genus nouns, and the particles man, mā, kull and jamīʿ; an indefinite is general only under negation, with the article where there is no known referent, or with a general description (v1/151–162)

• Position: «أَلْفَاظ الْعُمُوم قِسْمَانِ عَام بصيغته وَمَعْنَاهُ وَقسم فَرد بصيغته عَام بِمَعْنَاهُ» — "The words of generality are two kinds: general in form and meaning, and singular in form but general in meaning." (v1/151)
• Plurals (v1/151–153)
  • The least true plural is three (Muḥammad in al-Siyar al-kabīr; "I owe him dirhams" = three). Some Shāfiʿīs: two, citing "two and above are a congregation". Proofs: "one rider is a devil, two are two devils, three are a company"; one can say "there are not men in the house, only two"; the grammarians' three-way division.
  • Two daughters taking two-thirds comes from the indication (ishāra) of "the male gets the share of two females": «فَإِن نصيب الابْن مَعَ الِابْنَة الثُّلُثَانِ فَيثبت بِهِ أَن ذَلِك حَظّ الْأُنْثَيَيْنِ» — "the son's share with a daughter is two-thirds, which establishes that as the two females' portion" (v1/153) — not from the plural. Blocking the mother by two brothers is a separate case, from the Companions' agreement: Ibn ʿAbbās told ʿUthmān "'brothers' in your people's language does not include two", and ʿUthmān replied, "yes, but I am ashamed to differ from what they held". (v1/152–153)
  • ⚑ Abū Yūsuf too holds the least plural is three; he counts the imam within it, so two men behind him suffice for Friday prayer. Abū Ḥanīfa and Muḥammad require three besides the imam, «فَيشْتَرط ثَلَاثَة سواهُ» — "so three besides him are required" (v1/151) — since for them the imam and the congregation are two separate conditions.
• Singular in form, general in meaning: qawm, rahṭ; "ṭāʾifa" in the law's usage is "one and above" (Ibn ʿAbbās, Qatāda). Genus nouns ("water") cover the least and admit the whole. (v1/153–155) [v1/154 is largely missing in turath; read in the ʿIlmiyya witness and paraphrased, no quote:] an oath "if I marry the women (al-nisāʾ, with the article)" is broken by one woman: the article turns the plural into a genus, and one in a genus is like three in a plural ("women" without the article needs three, v1/153). If he meant the plural it is never broken, and he is believed in court, because he intended the literal sense; intending to narrow a general word is different, and there he is not believed in court. (v1/154)
• Particles (v1/155–158): man (who), for rational beings, general by default; mā (what); alladhī; ayna and ḥaythu (places); matā (times); kull (encompassing each one singly); jamīʿ (encompassing all together).
  • ⚑ "Free whichever of my slaves you wish": Abū Ḥanīfa: all but one ("min" is partitive); Abū Yūsuf and Muḥammad: all. "Choose of the three divorces what you wish": two, for Abū Ḥanīfa; three, for the two. (v1/155, 157)
  • "Whoever enters this fortress first gets a bonus": if two enter together, neither gets it. With "kull man" (each who), each of ten who enter together gets it in full. With "jamīʿ man" (all who), the ten share one bonus. (v1/156, 158)
  • Kull attached to a noun makes the noun general, not the act: «توجب الْعُمُوم فِيمَا وصلت بِهِ من الِاسْم دون الْفِعْل» — "it makes what it is joined to general in the noun, not the act" (v1/157). So "every woman (kull imraʾa) I marry is divorced" does not divorce the same woman again on a second marriage to her, since it is general over women, not over the event of marrying. Kullamā instead governs the act: "whenever (kullamā) I marry a woman" divorces her again each time he marries her, however often (v1/157–158, paraphrased across a turath page-seam gap). Cross-reference B2.05.
• The indefinite noun (nakira) (v1/158–162)
  • In an affirmative statement it is specific. Against al-Shāfiʿī, who reads "freeing a neck" (Q 4:92, 58:3) as general and then specifies out the non-Muslim slave by qiyās on the killing expiation. «وَنحن نقُول هَذِه رَقَبَة مُطلقَة غير مُقَيّدَة بِوَصْف فالتقييد بِالْوَصْفِ يكون زِيَادَة وَلَا يكون تَخْصِيصًا فَيكون نسخا» — "We say: this is an unqualified 'neck', not restricted by a description; restricting it by a description is an addition, not a specification, and so it is abrogation." (v1/159) Requiring a sound body and full slavery is not such a restriction: the unqualified word requires the complete, so a crippled slave is not fully a "neck"; and freeing a mudabbar or umm walad only hastens what they were owed, so it is not a full, fresh freeing. (v1/159)
  • An indefinite repeated is a new one: "one hardship will not overcome two eases" (Ibn ʿAbbās). ⚑ Two acknowledgements of 100 in two places: two debts, for Abū Ḥanīfa; one, for the Ṣāḥibān, by custom. (v1/159–160)
  • It becomes general: in a negation ("do not call on anyone with God"); with the article where there is no known referent ("the thief…"); or with a general description ("except a learned man"). (v1/160–161)
  • Ayy (which) is specific unless joined to a general description ("whichever of my slaves strikes you" frees all who strike). (v1/161–162)

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B4.06 · حكم المشترك والمؤول · The equivocal requires suspension with belief and a search; the interpreted binds action without certainty (v1/162–163)

• Position: «وَأما حكم الْمُشْتَرك فالتوقف فِيهِ إِلَى أَن يظْهر المُرَاد بِالْبَيَانِ على اعْتِقَاد أَن مَا هُوَ المُرَاد حق» (v1/162) — "The ruling of the equivocal is to suspend until the meaning appears by explanation, believing that what is meant is true", while searching by reflection on the wording or by another proof. (v1/162–163) E.g. "I usurped a thing from him": the word "usurped" shows it is property; its kind and amount come from the speaker. (v1/163)
  • «وَأما حكم المؤول فوجوب الْعَمَل بِهِ على حسب وجوب الْعَمَل بِالظَّاهِرِ إِلَّا أَن وجوب الْعَمَل بِالظَّاهِرِ ثَابت قطعا وَوُجُوب الْعَمَل بالمؤول ثَابت مَعَ احْتِمَال السَّهْو والغلط» — "The ruling of the interpreted is the duty to act on it like the apparent, except that acting on the apparent is certain, while acting on the interpreted holds with the possibility of error", like a single report. Example: water judged pure by one's best estimate. (v1/163)

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