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B7 · باب بيان الأحكام الثابتة بظاهر النص دون القياس والرأي · Four ways a text yields rulings without qiyās, and the inferences Sarakhsī rejects (v1/236–277)

1. B7.01 · العبارة والإشارة · ʿIbāra is what the passage is for; ishāra follows from the wording by reflection, with nothing added or removed (v1/236)
2. B7.02 · أمثلة الإشارة · Examples of rulings by indication: minimum pregnancy, the father's position, maintenance of kin, fasting and expiation (v1/236–240) [middle OCR-recovered]
3. B7.03 · إشارة «أغنوهم عَن الْمَسْأَلَة» (v1/240) · The ḥadīth on ṣadaqat al-fiṭr indicates who pays, who receives, when, and in what; ⚑ on giving only to Muslim poor (v1/240–241)
4. B7.04 · دلالة النص · Dalāla is known from the text's meaning in language, not by juristic reasoning; so it can establish punishments and expiations, which qiyās cannot (v1/241–242)
5. B7.05 · حدود الدلالة في العقوبات · ⚑ Sodomy and killing with a blunt object: the Ṣāḥibān extend the ḥadd and retaliation by dalāla; Abū Ḥanīfa says the meaning is not complete (v1/242–244)
6. B7.06 · الدلالة في الصوم · Expiation on the woman and for eating, and the forgetful man's intercourse, are by dalāla; al-Shāfiʿī's analogy of error and coercion to forgetting is qiyās, and faulty (v1/244–246)
7. B7.07 · دعاوى الدلالة المردودة · Al-Shāfiʿī's expiation for deliberate killing and for the false oath, and prostration for deliberate omission, are not dalāla (v1/246–248)
8. B7.08 · المقتضى · The presupposed is what must be added for the text to make sense or take effect; it has no generality, against al-Shāfiʿī; ⚑ on "free him for nothing" (v1/248–250)
9. B7.09 · المحذوف غير المقتضى · What is dropped for brevity belongs to language and can be general; what is presupposed belongs to law and cannot; "divorced" does not take an intention of three (v1/251–254)
10. B7.10 · احتمال التخصيص · The presupposed and the implied cannot be narrowed; the indicated can, on Sarakhsī's sounder view (v1/254)
11. B7.11 · مفهوم اللقب والعدد · Naming a thing does not deny the ruling to others, even with a number (v1/255–256)
12. B7.12 · مفهوم الصفة · A description attached to a ruling does not deny it when absent, against al-Shāfiʿī (v1/256–260)
13. B7.13 · مفهوم الشرط · A condition establishes the ruling when met; it does not deny it before, against al-Shāfiʿī; the condition works on the cause, not on its effect (v1/260–265)
14. B7.14 · بقاء التعليق بعد فوات المحل · ⚑ Zufar: a hung divorce survives three divorces; "we": it lapses when the subject is lost (v1/265–267)
15. B7.15 · حمل المطلق على المقيد · Unqualified and qualified texts each keep their own ruling, except where a text (a mashhūr report suffices) restricts what is one and the same ruling; al-Shāfiʿī's carrying the unqualified onto the qualified is rejected (v1/267–271)
16. B7.16 · العام الوارد على سبب · A general statement tied to an occasion: four cases; only the self-standing answer with extra words is disputed, and it stays general (v1/271–273)
17. B7.17 · تخصيص العام بغرض المتكلم · A merely inferred aim does not narrow a workable general form, even in praise or blame (v1/273)
18. B7.18 · القران في النظم · Being joined in one passage does not make rulings equal; wāw between complete sentences is for style, not sharing (v1/273–276)
19. B7.19 · الجمع المضاف إلى جماعة · A plural attributed to a group matches one to one (v1/276–277)

B7.01 · العبارة والإشارة · ʿIbāra is what the passage is for; ishāra follows from the wording by reflection, with nothing added or removed (v1/236)

• Position: «هَذِه الْأَحْكَام تَنْقَسِم أَرْبَعَة أَقسَام الثَّابِت بِعِبَارَة النَّص وَالثَّابِت بإشارته وَالثَّابِت بدلالته وَالثَّابِت بِمُقْتَضَاهُ» — "These rulings fall into four kinds: what is established by the text's wording (ʿibāra), by its indication (ishāra), by its implied meaning (dalāla), and by what it presupposes (iqtiḍāʾ)." (v1/236)
  • «فَأَما الثَّابِت بالعبارة فَهُوَ مَا كَانَ السِّيَاق لأَجله وَيعلم قبل التَّأَمُّل أَن ظَاهر النَّص متناول لَهُ» — "What is established by the wording is what the passage was brought for, and one knows before reflecting that the text's surface covers it." (v1/236)
  • «وَالثَّابِت بِالْإِشَارَةِ مَا لم يكن السِّيَاق لأَجله لكنه يعلم بِالتَّأَمُّلِ فِي معنى اللَّفْظ من غير زِيَادَة فِيهِ وَلَا نُقْصَان» — "What is established by indication is what the passage was not brought for, but is known by reflecting on the meaning of the words, with nothing added or removed." (v1/236)
• Analogy: a man looks at someone coming toward him and catches others at the edge of his sight; an archer skilled enough hits two game animals with one arrow. Both are established by the text, though they may differ in strength when they conflict. (v1/236)
• Proof text: "for the poor emigrants" (Q 59:8). By wording, they get a share of fayʾ. By indication, their property left in Mecca passed out of their ownership when the unbelievers seized it, since God called them "poor", and the poor man is one who does not own, not one far from his property (so the traveller is rich, the mukātab is not). (v1/236)
• Because ishāra needs reflection, scholars differ over it. "It has been said (qīla)" that indication is to wording as allusion (kināya, taʿrīḍ) is to explicit speech, or as the problematic (mushkil) to the clear. Some of it yields certainty like the wording, and some does not: it fails to when the literal and figurative senses are equally possible as what is meant. (v1/236) [T is scrambled at this seam; read with the ʿIlmiyya order.]

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B7.02 · أمثلة الإشارة · Examples of rulings by indication: minimum pregnancy, the father's position, maintenance of kin, fasting and expiation (v1/236–240) [middle OCR-recovered]

• Minimum pregnancy: "his bearing and weaning are thirty months" (Q 46:15). By wording, the mother's favour (minna) toward the child. By indication, pregnancy lasts at least six months, since weaning is two years (Q 31:14). «وَلِهَذَا خَفِي ذَلِك على أَكثر الصَّحَابَة» (v1/237) — "and for this reason it was hidden from most of the Companions". Ibn ʿAbbās alone understood it, and they accepted it from him. (v1/236–237)
• "On the one to whom the child is born" (Q 2:233). By wording, her maintenance is on the father. By indication: the child's lineage goes to the father (the lām of belonging); the father has a quasi-right in the child's person and property ("you and your wealth belong to your father"), so he is not punished for destroying him (retaliation) and no ḥadd applies for intercourse with his son's slave woman, even knowing she is forbidden to him; no one shares the child's maintenance with him; the mother cannot be hired to nurse while the marriage stands; and the nurse's pay need not be specified, which supports Abū Ḥanīfa on hiring a wet nurse for food and clothing. (v1/237)
• [OCR-recovered] Witness: Dār Asfār ed., vol. 1, print pp. 665–669, page images, footnotes excluded. Boundaries: from "wa-fī qawlihi taʿālā: wa-ʿalā al-wārithi mithlu dhālika", right after T v1/237 ends with the wet-nurse ruling, to "…ṣifa tunbiʾu ʿan al-ḥāja fī", where T v1/240 resumes. Paraphrase only.
  • "And on the heir the like of that" (Q 2:233): maintenance is owed to other kin, since inheriting rests on kinship. Kin other than the father pay in proportion to their inheritance shares, so a grandfather and mother pay a child's maintenance in thirds. But children maintain parents not by inheritance shares but by the fact of birth, so on the sounder of two reports a poor man's well-off son and daughter share his maintenance in halves. (Asfār 665–666)
  • "Eat and drink until the white thread…" (Q 2:187). By wording, eating, drinking and intercourse are allowed all night, and the earlier rule is abrogated. By indication: whoever wakes up junub has a valid fast, since if intercourse may run to the night's end, bathing must come after dawn; the intention may be made after dawn, since "then complete the fast" uses thumma (delayed sequence), and making it earlier is a concession; and the pillar of fasting is refraining from the two appetites, so intercourse breaks the fast like eating and they are equal for expiation. (Asfār 666–668)
  • Expiation for oaths (Q 5:89). By wording, aw gives a choice among the three kinds, one of which is due. "Or clothing them" requires giving the garment into the poor man's ownership (tamlīk), since expiation is an act, and kiswa is the garment itself, so the act is taking it out of one's ownership. (Asfār 668)
  • al-Shāfiʿī reasoned feeding from clothing, requiring ownership of the food. We say the text names "feeding" (iṭʿām), which means enabling him to eat, and that is completed by letting him eat; so ownership is not required, and requiring it adds to the text without need. Clothing differs, since letting him use a garment is a loan of its use. Ownership in food is allowed anyway (against "some people"), because by indication the aim is to meet the poor man's need, and ownership covers all of that. (Asfār 668–669)
• Resumes in T: since the need renews daily, one poor man fed on ten days counts as ten poor men, but not all at once. Clothing may also go to one man over ten days, since need met by ownership is taken to renew with the days. ⚑ Some shaykhs allow feeding one man in one day in separate payments, but only where the food is given into his ownership, not where he is merely let eat; most tie food to the days. (v1/240)

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B7.03 · إشارة «أغنوهم عَن الْمَسْأَلَة» (v1/240) · The ḥadīth on ṣadaqat al-fiṭr indicates who pays, who receives, when, and in what; ⚑ on giving only to Muslim poor (v1/240–241)

• "Make them free of begging on a day like this". By wording, the fiṭr charity is due on the ʿĪd day, to the poor. By indication: it is due only on the rich; it goes to the needy; it should be paid before going to the prayer ground; it becomes due at dawn; any wealth suffices (cash may serve better); and giving it to one poor man is better. (v1/240–241)
• Who: ⚑ Abū Yūsuf: it may be given only to Muslim poor, since the ʿĪd is for rich and poor alike. Abū Ḥanīfa and Muḥammad: that is the preferred course, as paying before the prayer is preferred though delay is allowed. (v1/240–241)
• This is what "I was given comprehensive speech (jawāmiʿ al-kalim)" means. (v1/241)

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B7.04 · دلالة النص · Dalāla is known from the text's meaning in language, not by juristic reasoning; so it can establish punishments and expiations, which qiyās cannot (v1/241–242)

• Position: «فَأَما الثَّابِت بِدلَالَة النَّص فَهُوَ مَا ثَبت بِمَعْنى النّظم لُغَة لَا استنباطا بِالرَّأْيِ» — "What is established by the implied meaning of the text is what follows from the wording's meaning in language, not what is drawn out by juristic reasoning." (v1/241) Qiyās is a meaning inferred from what has legal effect, to extend a ruling to what has no text (the ribā ʿilla of measure and weight). So «ويشترك فِي معرفَة دلَالَة النَّص كل من لَهُ بصر فِي معنى الْكَلَام لُغَة فَقِيها أَو غير فَقِيه» — "everyone with insight into the meaning of speech in language, jurist or not, shares in knowing the text's implied meaning." (v1/241)
• Examples: "say not 'uff' to them" (Q 17:23): the reason is harm, so insults and beating are forbidden by dalāla; where "uff" is a courtesy in someone's language, no prohibition. Māʿiz was stoned for zinā while muḥṣan, not for being Māʿiz; the Bedouin's expiation was for his offence; the cat "is among those who go around among you" extends to mice and snakes; the mustaḥāḍa's "a vein that burst" extends to all blood from veins. (v1/241–242)
• Consequence: «وَلِهَذَا جَوَّزنَا إِثْبَات الْعُقُوبَات وَالْكَفَّارَات بِدلَالَة النَّص وَإِن كُنَّا لَا نجوز ذَلِك بِالْقِيَاسِ» — "Hence we allow punishments and expiations to be established by the text's implied meaning, although we do not allow that by qiyās." So the ḥadd of brigandage falls on the helper (radʾ), since "waging war" means in language overpowering and terrifying so that the road is cut. (v1/242)
• [Editorial] Debate note: this is Sarakhsī's line between dalāla and qiyās. The test Sarakhsī gives is whether a non-jurist who knows the language would grasp it. Use it when an opponent calls a Ḥanafī ḥadd "qiyās in ḥudūd".

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B7.05 · حدود الدلالة في العقوبات · ⚑ Sodomy and killing with a blunt object: the Ṣāḥibān extend the ḥadd and retaliation by dalāla; Abū Ḥanīfa says the meaning is not complete (v1/242–244)

• Who: ⚑ sodomy. Abū Yūsuf and Muḥammad: ḥadd on both parties by the dalāla of the zinā text, since zinā is satisfying lust to spill semen unlawfully, and all of that is present. (v1/242–243) Abū Ḥanīfa: it falls short of the meaning for which the ḥadd was laid down: «وَفِي بَاب الْعُقُوبَات تعْتَبر صفة الْكَمَال لما فِي النُّقْصَان من شُبْهَة الْعَدَم» — "In punishments, completeness is what counts, since a shortfall carries the doubt of absence." The natural urge exists from both sides only in the front passage; zinā also corrupts the bed and loses the child. Stricter prohibition does not decide punishment (blood and urine are more forbidden than wine, yet only wine carries a ḥadd). (v1/243)
• Who: ⚑ "no retaliation except by the sword". By dalāla, spear and arrow also bring retaliation, since the sword stands for killing. (v1/243) Abū Ḥanīfa: the meaning of the sword is that it breaks the body by wounding, inside and out, so stone and stick are not included. The Ṣāḥibān: the meaning is what the body cannot withstand, which is plainer in a heavy object (a millstone), so it is a fortiori, like beating after "uff". (v1/243–244) Abū Ḥanīfa's reply: in what is averted by doubt, completeness in the cause counts. Slaughter (dhakāt) shows the deficiency: it is limited to what breaks the body outwardly and inwardly. A needle wound brings retaliation, since it draws blood inside and out, but it does not make an animal lawful, since slaughter needs all the flowing blood to run. (v1/244)

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B7.06 · الدلالة في الصوم · Expiation on the woman and for eating, and the forgetful man's intercourse, are by dalāla; al-Shāfiʿī's analogy of error and coercion to forgetting is qiyās, and faulty (v1/244–246)

• The Bedouin's expiation was for an offence against the fast (breaking its pillar), not against the woman, so: the woman who consents owes it too, and eating and drinking bring it as well, since appetite for food is stronger in the fasting day; intercourse is only the tool. (v1/244–245)
• "God fed you and gave you drink" for the forgetful eater extends to forgetful intercourse by dalāla, since forgetting means being carried to the act without anyone's doing. (v1/245) Objection → Reply: intercourse is not the fasting day's usual temptation. Reply: it has an extra pull (overwhelming desire) that balances this. That extra pull does not count for expiation, since lawful intercourse at night removes it and it is rare. (v1/245–246)
• Who: al-Shāfiʿī extends it to the coerced and the one who errs: «حَيْثُ جعل الْمُكْره والخاطىء بِمَنْزِلَة النَّاسِي بِاعْتِبَار وصف الْعذر» — "in that he treated the coerced and the one in error like the forgetful, on the shared quality of excuse". Sarakhsī: that is qiyās, «وَهُوَ قِيَاس فَاسد» — "and it is a faulty qiyās": coercion comes from another person, and error can in general be guarded against. (v1/246)
• By dalāla, make-up is owed by one who breaks the fast without excuse, since illness and travel excuse, they do not cause the duty. (v1/246)

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B7.07 · دعاوى الدلالة المردودة · Al-Shāfiʿī's expiation for deliberate killing and for the false oath, and prostration for deliberate omission, are not dalāla (v1/246–248)

• Who: al-Shāfiʿī: expiation for deliberate killing, since the text on accidental killing pins it on killing, and error only lightens; for the false oath (ghamūs), since it violates God's name more than breaking a future oath; and sujūd al-sahw for deliberate addition or omission, since the defect is greater. (v1/246, 248)
• Reply: expiation is worship with a punitive side, so «فيستدعي سَببا مترددا بَين الْحَظْر وَالْإِبَاحَة» — "it calls for a cause that wavers between prohibition and permission". Accidental killing wavers (shooting at game, hitting a person); a future oath wavers (honouring God's name, yet "do not make God a target for your oaths"). Deliberate killing and the false oath are purely forbidden, like zinā and apostasy. (v1/247) The text's cause for prostration is forgetting ("for every lapse two prostrations"), which is absent when deliberate. (v1/248)
• Objection → Reply: Abū Ḥanīfa gives expiation for killing with a heavy object, though forbidden. Reply: the tool is made for discipline, so a doubt enters the act, which counts for both retaliation and expiation. The musta'min killed on purpose brings no expiation: retaliation fails there for lack of equality between the two persons, not from any doubt in the act; a mustaʾmin who kills a mustaʾmin is subject to retaliation, as al-Siyar al-kabīr states. (v1/247–248)

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B7.08 · المقتضى · The presupposed is what must be added for the text to make sense or take effect; it has no generality, against al-Shāfiʿī; ⚑ on "free him for nothing" (v1/248–250)

• Position: «وَالنَّوْع الرَّابِع وَهُوَ الْمُقْتَضى وَهُوَ عبارَة عَن زِيَادَة على الْمَنْصُوص عَلَيْهِ يشْتَرط تَقْدِيمه ليصير المنظوم مُفِيدا أَو مُوجبا للْحكم» — "The fourth kind is the presupposed: an addition to what is stated, which must be put first for the wording to make sense or to yield the ruling." It ranks with dalāla, not with qiyās, but dalāla is stronger in a conflict, since it comes from the language, while the presupposed is established by law, out of need. «وَلَا عُمُوم للمقتضى عندنَا» — "and the presupposed has no generality, in our view." (v1/248)
• Who: al-Shāfiʿī: it has generality, as it counts like the stated text. Reply: it is established by necessity, and «وَالثَّابِت بِالْحَاجةِ يتَقَدَّر بِقَدرِهَا» — "what is established by need is measured by the need", like carrion permitted only to keep alive. (v1/248) It is a follower, bound by the conditions of what it serves. (v1/249)
• Furūʿ test
  • "Free your slave on my behalf for 1,000": the freeing counts for the one who asked and he owes 1,000. A sale is presupposed, placed first like a condition, and its acceptance is dropped. If the one asking cannot free, no sale arises. If the owner states the sale outright, it does not count for the asker. (v1/249)
  • ⚑ "Free your slave on my behalf for nothing": Abū Yūsuf, it counts for the asker, since the gift's taking-possession is dropped as the sale's acceptance was. His strongest case: the coerced man told to "free your slave on my behalf for 1,000" — that sale is invalid (fāsid), yet possession, though a condition for ownership even in an invalid sale, was dropped there too when it came by the presupposition of manumission. (v1/249) Abū Ḥanīfa and Muḥammad: «الْمُقْتَضى تبع للمقتضي وَالْقَبْض فعل لَيْسَ من جنس القَوْل» (v1/249) — "the presupposed follows what presupposes it, and taking possession is an act, not of the kind of speech", "nor below it, so that it could be established as its follower"; possession for a gift cannot be dropped, while acceptance in sale can (sale by handing over). Reply to the invalid-sale case: an invalid sale cannot be a root whose ruling is read off itself, so what drops in the valid sale drops in the invalid one (as when the seller says "I have sold you this garment for ten, so cut it" and the buyer's cutting alone completes the sale) — so dropping possession there does not carry over to a gift, where possession cannot be dropped. (v1/249–250)
  • al-Shāfiʿī: "if I eat" with an intention of one food works, since eating presupposes food, which is general. We say it does not: no generality, so narrowing it is void; unlike "if I eat food". Likewise drinking, wearing, riding, bathing, and "if anyone bathes" versus "if he bathes". (v1/250)
  • "Count [your ʿidda]" with intention, after consummation: divorce by presupposition, so it is revocable and the intention of three does not work. (v1/250; the consummation condition is at v1/189) Before consummation the same wording works differently, as a term borrowed for divorce (see B5.07, v1/189).

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B7.09 · المحذوف غير المقتضى · What is dropped for brevity belongs to language and can be general; what is presupposed belongs to law and cannot; "divorced" does not take an intention of three (v1/251–254)

• Who: some author treated the dropped word as presupposed: "ask the town" (Q 12:82, its people); "lifted from my community are error…" (the ruling); "actions are by intentions" (the ruling). al-Shāfiʿī then made "lifted" cover this world and the next, so no divorce for the one in error or coerced, and no broken fast when eating under coercion. "We" said the next world's ruling (the sin) is meant by consensus and suffices. (v1/251)
• Position: «وَعِنْدِي أَن هَذَا سَهْو من قَائِله فَإِن الْمَحْذُوف غير الْمُقْتَضى» (v1/251) — "To me this is an oversight by whoever said it: the dropped word is not the presupposed." Dropping for brevity is language; «وَثُبُوت الْمُقْتَضى يكون شرعا لَا لُغَة» (v1/251) — "the presupposed is established by law, not by language". The test: the presupposed completes what is stated; the dropped word, once spelled out, moves the ruling onto itself. (v1/251–252) Those ḥadīths lack generality because the dropped word is like a shared (mushtarak) word, not because it is presupposed. What is dropped can be general if it admits generality. (v1/252)
• Who: "you are divorced" / "I have divorced you" with an intention of three. al-Shāfiʿī: it works, since "divorced" presupposes a divorce that is general. We say: "divorced" describes her with a single attribute that cannot bear number, and an intention works only in what the words can bear. "Visit your father" or "go on ḥajj", intended as divorce, does nothing, though they presuppose going. "You are separated" (bāʾin) differs: separation has two kinds, cutting ownership and cutting lawfulness, and intending three picks one of them. (v1/252–253)
  • "Divorce yourself" does take three, since the command's verbal noun is future and general, but not two. "If you go out" intending a place does not work; intending travel does, as travel is a kind of going out. "If I live with him" intending one room works (the fullest living together); a specific place does not. (v1/253)
• Objection → Reply: "this is my son" for a child with a known mother, who later claims inheritance as his wife: the marriage is fully established, beyond need. Reply: that marriage comes by dalāla, not presupposition, since "son" implies father and mother; once established it continues until death ends it. Even granting an iqtiḍāʾ account, the answer would still hold: once a contract is established by presupposition, it continues not because a proof keeps it going but because no proof removes it, so its later inheritance effect proves nothing about the muqtaḍā's generality. (v1/253–254)

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B7.10 · احتمال التخصيص · The presupposed and the implied cannot be narrowed; the indicated can, on Sarakhsī's sounder view (v1/254)

• The presupposed has no generality, so no narrowing. The implied meaning is covered by the text in language, so excluding part of it is abrogation, not narrowing. (v1/254)
• Who: ⚑ some of our shaykhs: the indicated cannot be narrowed, since it is extra to what the passage is for. Sarakhsī: «وَالأَصَح عِنْدِي أَنه يحْتَمل ذَلِك» — "the sounder view, to me, is that it can", because it comes from the wording like the ʿibāra, and generality belongs to wording. (v1/254)

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B7.11 · مفهوم اللقب والعدد · Naming a thing does not deny the ruling to others, even with a number (v1/255–256)

• Position: «وَقد عمل قوم فِي النُّصُوص بِوُجُوه هِيَ فَاسِدَة عندنَا» — "Some have worked with texts in ways that are invalid in our view." (v1/255)
• Who: some say naming a thing by its proper name limits the ruling to it, or the naming would be pointless; the Anṣār took "water is from water" to deny bathing after intercourse without emission. (v1/255)
• Reply: the sacred months ("do not wrong yourselves in them", Q 9:36), "except if God wills" (Q 18:23), the stagnant water ḥadīth. If they mean the ruling rests on the text only in the named thing, no one disputes it: in its kind the ruling rests on the text's ʿilla, not the text. If they mean the text denies the ruling elsewhere, that is false, since the text does not cover it; and ta'līl of texts would be impossible. The Anṣār relied on the lām of the genus. The point of naming is to let jurists seek the ʿilla. (v1/255–256)
• Who: reported from al-Thaljī: naming a thing by its proper name denies the rest only where the text also binds it by an explicit number, such as "five harmful creatures" and "two carcasses and two bloods"; naming not bound by a number, such as the ribā report, does not deny the rest. Sarakhsī: «وَالصَّحِيح أَن التَّنْصِيص لَا يدل على ذَلِك فِي شَيْء من الْمَوَاضِع» — "The sound view is that naming indicates that in no case." The number gives the ruling by the text; elsewhere it holds by the ʿilla. (v1/256)

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B7.12 · مفهوم الصفة · A description attached to a ruling does not deny it when absent, against al-Shāfiʿī (v1/256–260)

• Who: al-Shāfiʿī: «إِن التَّنْصِيص على وصف فِي الْمُسَمّى لإِيجَاب الحكم يُوجب نفي ذَلِك الحكم عِنْد عدم ذَلِك الْوَصْف» (v1/256) — "naming a description in the thing named, to establish a ruling, requires denying that ruling where the description is absent". So no marriage to a scriptuary slave woman ("believing slave women", Q 4:25); no in-law prohibition by zinā ("your wives with whom you consummated", Q 4:23); no fiṭr charity for a non-Muslim slave ("of the Muslims"). (v1/256–257)
  • His proofs: grazing animals (only sāʾima pay zakat, by agreement); "profit on what one does not bear the risk of" implies profit on what one does is allowed; the description acts as a condition ("if you enter the house riding"); and, on his principle, a condition implies denial. (v1/257–258)
• Position: «وَعِنْدنَا النَّص مُوجب للْحكم عِنْد وجود ذَلِك الْوَصْف وَلَا يُوجب نفي ذَلِك الحكم عِنْد انعدامه أصلا» — "In our view the text makes the ruling due where the description exists, and does not require its denial where the description is absent, at all." (v1/256)
• Proofs: "your maternal cousins who emigrated with you" (Q 33:50); "do not consume it wastefully and hastily" (Q 4:6); "you only warn those who fear it" (Q 79:45). An effective description is like an ʿilla, and an ʿilla does not deny the ruling when absent. So grazing is the cause of zakat ("zakat of grazing animals"), and working animals are excluded by another text ("no zakat on working animals"). "If you enter riding" is a condition only because it is joined to a condition. (v1/257–259) The fiṭr text limited to Muslims does not cover unbelievers, but the unqualified text does. (v1/257)
• Furūʿ test: ⚑ Zufar: an umm walad's three children, "the eldest is my son", gives the other two his lineage too. We deny it, not because of the description, but because silence when a statement is needed is denial, and he must claim the children of his own seed. (v1/259) ⚑ Witnesses for an heir, "we know no other heir of his in such-and-such land": Abū Ḥanīfa accepts it; Abū Yūsuf and Muḥammad reject it for suspicion, not because the words deny another heir. (v1/259–260)

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B7.13 · مفهوم الشرط · A condition establishes the ruling when met; it does not deny it before, against al-Shāfiʿī; the condition works on the cause, not on its effect (v1/260–265)

• Who: al-Shāfiʿī: a ruling hung on a condition is absent when the condition is absent, as the text says. So no marriage to a slave woman for one who can afford a free woman (Q 4:25); and the woman who refuses liʿān is punished (Q 24:8). (v1/260)
• Position: «وَعِنْدنَا لَا يُوجب النَّص ذَلِك بل يُوجب ثُبُوت الحكم عِنْد وجود الشَّرْط فَأَما انعدام الحكم عِنْد عدم الشَّرْط فَهُوَ بَاقٍ على مَا كَانَ قبل التَّعْلِيق» — "In our view the text does not require that; it requires the ruling where the condition exists. As for its absence when the condition is absent, that remains as it was before the hanging." (v1/260)
• al-Shāfiʿī's reasoning: hanging acts on the ruling, not its cause; "you are free if you enter" would free now but for the hanging, like a deferred term or a lamp hung by a rope. Hence: no hanging divorce or manumission on future ownership (the cause needs present ownership); expiation may be paid after the oath and before breaking it (the oath is the cause), in money but not in fasting. (v1/260–262)
• Reply: on Q 4:25, "once they are muḥṣan [married], if they then commit indecency": the ḥadd penalty for the offence still binds her even when she is not muḥṣan, so the absence of iḥṣān does not remove it — the condition is iḥṣān, not the indecency. And "write them if you know good in them" (Q 24:33) does not deny the ruling before the condition either. (v1/262) «التَّعْلِيق بِالشّرطِ تصرف فِي أصل الْعلَّة لَا فِي حكمهَا» (v1/262) — "hanging on a condition acts on the cause itself, not on its effect": before the condition it is not yet a cause, only something that may become one, as an arrow is not a killing until it reaches its target, and a shield stops it before that. (v1/262–263)
  • So expiation before breaking the oath is invalid: the oath aims at keeping it, and cannot be the cause of what exists only once it is broken. The money/fasting distinction fails, since worship is an act in both. (v1/263)
  • Hanging divorce on future ownership is valid: what hangs is an oath, whose seat is the person's obligation. A sale with a condition option differs: the option enters the effect, not the cause, since sale cannot bear a risk (allowed only by the Sunna). One who swears not to sell breaks the oath by a sale with option; one who swears not to divorce does not break it by a hung divorce until the condition. (v1/264)
  • So marrying a slave woman is allowed with the means for a free woman, by the general verses. (v1/264)
• Objection → Reply: one ruling cannot be both present now and hung on a future condition. Reply: lawful intercourse is not present before marriage; it hangs on marriage in other verses and on marriage plus this condition here, and one ruling may hang on two conditions ("free on Thursday", then "free on Friday"). One thing can be a full condition in one text and part of one in another ("free if you eat", then "free if you eat and drink"). (v1/265)

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B7.14 · بقاء التعليق بعد فوات المحل · ⚑ Zufar: a hung divorce survives three divorces; "we": it lapses when the subject is lost (v1/265–267)

• Who: ⚑ Zufar: "if you enter, you are thrice divorced", then three divorces: the hanging stands, so it can bite after she remarries him. Likewise a slave woman freed, who apostatises, is captured and owned again. His reason: the hanging blocks the link to the subject, so loss of the subject is like loss of ownership, which does not void it. (v1/265–266)
• Position: «وَلَكنَّا نقُول بانعدام الْمحل يبطل التَّعْلِيق» (v1/266) — "But we say: the hanging lapses when the subject ceases to exist." The hanging's validity rests on what will become a divorce, which cannot exist without the subject; three divorces destroy her lawfulness. Hanging needs a subject (manumission cannot be hung on an animal), so in what concerns the subject, continuing is like beginning. The hope of her becoming lawful again does not count at the start (hanging on a stranger or on a thrice-divorced woman is void), so it does not count for survival. It is different when he names ownership explicitly ("whenever I marry you"). And the hanging carries a semblance of the owned divorces, since it was valid only on their account, as usurpation carries a semblance of liability for value; once the three are pronounced, the owned divorces are gone, and the hanging with them. (v1/266–267)

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B7.15 · حمل المطلق على المقيد · Unqualified and qualified texts each keep their own ruling, except where a text (a mashhūr report suffices) restricts what is one and the same ruling; al-Shāfiʿī's carrying the unqualified onto the qualified is rejected (v1/267–271)

• Who: al-Shāfiʿī: the unqualified is carried onto the qualified, in one case or two, since the qualified "speaks" and the unqualified is "silent". Examples: grazing in zakat (agreed); justice in witnesses; the hady "reaching the Kaʿba" (Q 5:95) applied to all hadys; a believing slave in oath and ẓihār expiation, from the killing expiation; elbows in tayammum, from wuḍūʾ. But not the amounts of expiations, and not consecutive fasting for oath expiation, since there the parallels conflict (consecutive in ẓihār and killing, separated for the tamattuʿ fast, Q 2:196). (v1/267)
• Position: "we" say this is further off than the first issue, since here both ruling and ʿilla differ. "Ask not about things which, if shown to you, would trouble you" (Q 5:101): turning to the qualified to know the unqualified is doing what is forbidden, leaving unrestricted what God left unrestricted. Ibn ʿAbbās: «أبهموا مَا أبهم الله وَاتبعُوا مَا بَين» (v1/268) — "leave unrestricted what God left unrestricted, and follow what He made clear." ʿUmar: "a wife's mother is left unrestricted, so leave it unrestricted" (Q 4:23 against "your wives with whom you consummated"). (v1/267–268)
  • The belief in the killing expiation defines which slave is the lawful expiation; it is not a condition. The unbelieving slave fails there because it is not legislated, like shedding blood or freeing half a slave. (v1/268)
  • «فَكَمَا لَا يجوز حمل الْمُقَيد على الْمُطلق لإِثْبَات حكم الْإِطْلَاق فِيهِ لَا يجوز حمل الْمُطلق على الْمُقَيد لإِثْبَات حكم التَّقْيِيد فِيهِ» — "Just as the qualified may not be carried onto the unqualified to give it the unqualified ruling, the unqualified may not be carried onto the qualified to give it the qualified ruling." (v1/268)
  • Even granting that a qualifier acts as a condition, it cannot pass to another case without equality: the wife's mother and her daughter differ in custom; the killing expiation differs from the others in cause and ruling. (v1/269)
• Our own cases explained: consecutive fasting for oath expiation is «لَيْسَ بِحمْل الْمُطلق على الْمُقَيد بل بِقِرَاءَة ابْن مَسْعُود» (v1/269) — "not by carrying the unqualified onto the qualified, but by the reading of Ibn Masʿūd" ("three days consecutive"), well known up to Abū Ḥanīfa's time, and a well-known report can add to a text. It is not treated as a second text, because the ruling is one (discharge by fasting). The fiṭr texts concern the cause, and two causes can coexist. (v1/269–270)
  • Reply to the tamattuʿ exception: al-Shāfiʿī's excuse fails even on his own rule: an unqualified expiation would be carried only onto a qualified expiation, and no expiation fast is qualified by separation; the tamattuʿ fast is not a counterexample. Tamattuʿ fasting is not a kaffāra at all; it is a rite (nusk), standing in place of the blood offering, and it is not qualified by separation: splitting it before returning is barred only because it is time-assigned by "when you return" (Q 2:196), and what is time-assigned cannot come before its time, like the Ramaḍān fast before the month is sighted or the noon prayer before the sun declines. (v1/269)
  • Abū Ḥanīfa and Muḥammad: tayammum with anything of the earth (unqualified ḥadīth) and with soil (qualified ḥadīth), since the texts concern the subject. Elbows in tayammum come from the ḥadīth of al-Aslaʿ, not by carrying. Grazing: "no zakat on working animals". Justice: "verify" (Q 49:6) and "whom you approve" (Q 2:282). The hady: "its place is the Ancient House" (Q 22:33), or the name hady itself. (v1/270)
• Summary: «وَصَارَ حَاصِل الْكَلَام أَن النَّفْي ضد الْإِثْبَات فالنص الْمُوجب لإِثْبَات حكم لَا يُوجب ضد ذَلِك الحكم بعبارته» (v1/270) — "In sum: negation is the opposite of affirmation, so a text that affirms a ruling does not require its opposite by its wording", nor by indication, implied meaning or presupposition. Denial from it would be a ruling without proof. (v1/270–271)

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B7.16 · العام الوارد على سبب · A general statement tied to an occasion: four cases; only the self-standing answer with extra words is disputed, and it stays general (v1/271–273)

• «وَمن هَذِه الْجُمْلَة قَول بعض الْعلمَاء إِن الْعَام يخْتَص بِسَبَبِهِ» — "Of this kind is some scholars' view that the general is limited to its occasion." (v1/271) (The claim that a command implies the prohibition of its opposite was refuted in B3.)
• Four cases (v1/271–272):
  1. The occasion is reported with the ruling ("he forgot, so he prostrated"; "Māʿiz committed zinā, so he was stoned"; Q 2:282): limited to it, as it works like the ʿilla.
  2. The words cannot stand alone ("yes", "certainly"): limited to the question, so they count as admission. Balā answers a negated question (Q 7:172), naʿam a plain question (Q 7:44), ajal both. Muḥammad in K. al-Iqrār made them admissions even without a question, by usage.
  3. They stand alone but do not exceed the answer ("come and lunch with me", "if I lunch, my slave is free"): limited to that lunch.
  4. They stand alone and add something ("if I lunch today"): here is the dispute.
• Position: «فعندنا لَا يخْتَص مثل هَذَا الْعَام بِسَبَبِهِ» — "In our view such a general statement is not limited to its occasion": limiting it would cancel the extra words, and speech outweighs circumstance. If he says "I meant the answer", he is believed before God. (v1/272) Against "some scholars" who read it as the answer: that acts on the silent and leaves the stated. Proofs: the ẓihār verse (Khawla), the qadhf verse (ʿĀʾisha), the liʿān verse (Saʿd b. ʿUbāda), and the salam ḥadīth were not limited to their occasions. «فَعرفنَا أَن الْعَام لَا يخْتَص بِسَبَبِهِ» (v1/273) — "So we know that the general is not limited to its occasion." (v1/272–273)

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B7.17 · تخصيص العام بغرض المتكلم · A merely inferred aim does not narrow a workable general form, even in praise or blame (v1/273)

• Who: some people: speech is limited to the speaker's known aim, so words of praise, blame or exception have no generality. (v1/273)
• Position: «وَعِنْدنَا هَذَا فَاسد لِأَنَّهُ ترك مُوجب الصِّيغَة بِمُجَرَّد التشهي وَعمل بالمسكوت» — "In our view this is invalid: it leaves what the form requires out of mere preference, and acts on what is silent." The general is known by its form: once that form is found and its literal sense is workable, it must be acted on, and this stands even where the form is used for praise or blame, since general praise and blame are Arab usage. Weighing the aim is weighing a mere possibility, no ground to leave the literal sense. (v1/273)

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B7.18 · القران في النظم · Being joined in one passage does not make rulings equal; wāw between complete sentences is for style, not sharing (v1/273–276)

• Who: "some of the newer jurists" (baʿḍ al-aḥdāth min al-fuqahāʾ): being joined in the passage requires equality in the ruling (Q 2:197, "no obscenity, no wickedness, no quarrelling in ḥajj"). ⚑ "Some of our colleagues": "establish prayer and give zakat" means no zakat on a child, who owes no prayer. (v1/273)
• Position: «وَعِنْدنَا هَذَا فَاسد وَهُوَ من جنس الْعَمَل بالمسكوت وَترك الْعَمَل بِالدَّلِيلِ لأَجله» (v1/273) — "In our view this is invalid: it is of the kind that acts on the silent and leaves the proof for it." The wāw of style (naẓm) joins two complete sentences (Q 22:5; 42:24); the wāw of conjunction ('aṭf) joins an incomplete sentence to a complete one, so the first predicate is understood again. Sharing comes from the incomplete sentence's need, not the wāw itself. (v1/273–274)
• Objection → Reply: "my wife is divorced and my slave free, if he enters" hangs both. Reply: both are complete as enactments, but as hangings one is incomplete, so conjunction shares the condition. "I owe X 100 dinars and Y 1,000 dirhams except ten": the exception goes to the last, since both are complete as admissions. (v1/274–275)
• Furūʿ test: the qadhf verse (Q 24:4–5). We say the wāw of "and do not accept their testimony" is conjunction (both address the rulers, and rejection completes the ḥadd), while "and those are the corrupt" is style (a report about the accusers, not an address), so the exception "except those who repent" goes only to the label of corruption. al-Shāfiʿī reads the first as style and the second as conjunction, so the exception covers the testimony too, and ignores "then" (thumma) in "then do not bring four witnesses". (v1/275–276)
• [Editorial] Question: in B6.03 (v1/205) Sarakhsī's own sounder view is that wāw between two complete sentences is still conjunction, with sharing only by need; here (v1/273–275) he calls the wāw between complete sentences naẓm. On both pages the operative rule is the same: sharing in the predicate comes from the joined clause's need for one, not from the wāw itself. Only the label for the qadhf wāw differs (ʿaṭf there, naẓm here). Have both pages ready before arguing the qadhf verse.

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B7.19 · الجمع المضاف إلى جماعة · A plural attributed to a group matches one to one (v1/276–277)

• Who: some people: "take from their wealth a charity" (Q 9:103) and "lawful to you is what is beyond that" (Q 4:24) give each person the full plural. (v1/276)
• Position: «وَلَكِن مُقْتَضى هَذِه الصِّيغَة مُقَابلَة الْآحَاد بالآحاد» (v1/276) — "but what this form requires is matching units with units." al-Jāmiʿ: "if you two bear two children" is met when each bears one; "enter these two houses" when each enters one. Usage: "the people put on their clothes"; Q 71:7 "they put their fingers in their ears and covered themselves with their garments"; Q 66:4 "your hearts"; Q 5:38 "cut off their hands" (one hand each). (v1/276–277)

• The chapter closes: whoever grasps the valid and invalid ways can tell sound from unsound reasoning from texts. (v1/277)

• [Editorial] Debate note (bāb): B7.11–B7.15 is Sarakhsī's case against mafhūm al-mukhālafa and against carrying the unqualified onto the qualified; B7.16–B7.19 (occasion, aim, joining, plural to a group) share the same charge. Its recurring charge is "acting on the silent" (al-ʿamal bi-l-maskūt). When a debate turns on "the ḥadīth implies the opposite for those not named", check which of these faṣls governs (name, number, description, condition, occasion, aim, joining), since Sarakhsī answers each separately.

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