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B15 · باب وجوه الاعتراض على العلل · Objections to effective causes: four invalid (counter-case, wrong construction, ruling without the cause, distinguishing), four valid (denial, reversal, inversion, counter-cause); and how to answer a counter-case (v2/232–249)

1. B15.01 · الاعتراضات الفاسدة · Against an effective cause, four objections fail: the counter-case, "wrong construction", "the ruling exists without it", and distinguishing root from branch (v2/232–235)
2. B15.02 · الممانعة · Denial is the root of objection: of the cause as such, of the feature, of the condition, and of the effect; claimant and denier are judged by substance, not form (v2/235–237)
3. B15.03 · القلب · Reversal: making the effect the cause defeats a reasoning (taʿlīl) from ruling to ruling; equal rulings can instead support mutual inference (istidlāl); turning the opponent's feature into a witness against him is opposition with contradiction (v2/238–240)
4. B15.04 · العكس · Inversion: the reverse of concomitance supports a cause; the inversion that yields a contrary ruling is a weak objection (v2/241–242)
5. B15.05 · المعارضة · Opposition to the branch's ruling has five forms (two sound, one weak, two unsound); opposition by another cause in the root is always unsound (v2/242–246)
6. B15.06 · دفع المناقضة · A counter-case hits only ṭard causes; the answer reconciles in four ways: by the feature's wording, its effect, the ruling sought, or the aim of the reasoning (v2/246–249)

B15.01 · الاعتراضات الفاسدة · Against an effective cause, four objections fail: the counter-case, "wrong construction", "the ruling exists without it", and distinguishing root from branch (v2/232–235)

• Position: causes are of two kinds, ṭard and effective; objections to each are sound or unsound. «فالاعتراضات الْفَاسِدَة على الْعِلَل المؤثرة أَرْبَعَة» (v2/232) — "the unsound objections to effective causes are four": counter-case (munāqaḍa), wrong construction (fasād al-waḍʿ), the ruling's presence without the cause, and distinguishing (mufāraqa); the sound ones are denial (mumānaʿa), the voiding reversal (qalb), the breaking inversion (ʿaks), and a counter-cause (muʿāraḍa). (v2/232–233)
• Counter-case: effect is shown by the Book, the Sunna or consensus, which do not contradict each other; where the ruling fails, a feature was added or lost, so the cause is absent (like a witness who says "as far as I know"). Example: "the head-wipe is a wiping legislated in purification, so tripling it is not sunna, like the khuff" is not broken by stone-cleansing, which is not a wiping but removing impurity. (v2/233) → B13h.01
• Wrong construction: a claim that cannot be made good, since the effect rests on text or consensus, and claiming these are wrongly built is not allowed. Ruling without the cause: a ruling may stand on another cause, as, if two of four witnesses retract before judgment, judgment remains obligatory on the remaining pair's testimony. (v2/233–234)
• Distinguishing: «فَمن النَّاس من ظن أَنَّهَا مفاقهة» (v2/234) — "some thought it is real fiqh"; it is, elsewhere, but as an objection it is fruitless: (1) qiyās reasons from some features, not all, so naming another feature of the root only confirms it is qiyās; (2) the questioner is a denier, not a claimant, and proving a feature in the root is proving what is settled, linked to the branch only by its absence there, and absence causes nothing; (3) the root may have two causes, one extending. Real fiqh is to demand the effect. (v2/234–235)

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B15.02 · الممانعة · Denial is the root of objection: of the cause as such, of the feature, of the condition, and of the effect; claimant and denier are judged by substance, not form (v2/235–237)

• Position: «اعْلَم بِأَن الممانعة أصل الِاعْتِرَاض على الْعلَّة المؤثرة» (v2/235) — "denial is the root of objection to an effective cause": the answerer makes claims (the ruling; the feature as cause in the root; the branch as its like), and the questioner, like a defendant, need only ask for proof, as the Prophet asked the claimant "do you have evidence?". (v2/235)
• Four kinds: (1) denying that it is a cause at all, as with "no proof" reasoning (al-Shāfiʿī: marriage is not proved by women with men "since it is not property"); accepting it would be ignorance; (2) the opponent must deny the feature in reasonings such as Abū Ḥanīfa and Muḥammad's "depositing with a child is empowering him to destroy", Abū Ḥanīfa's "the partner consented to the cause of freedom", and our "the Day of Sacrifice fast is legislated, since it is forbidden" (for him an unqualified prohibition works like abrogation); (3) denying the condition (reasoning ribā by "food" changes the root's ruling); (4) demanding the effect, "the inner wisdom called fiqh". (v2/235–236) → B13d.05
• Substance over form: the depositary who claims return denies liability; the virgin who says "I refused" denies the marriage (her word); Abū Ḥanīfa and Abū Yūsuf: after the goods perish, the buyer who names the lower price denies the excess. So "the root's ruling rests on this feature plus another" is a valid denial: al-Shāfiʿī extends expiation from the future oath ("an intended oath by God") to the false oath (ghamūs); we deny: the root's ruling rests on that feature plus the conceivability of fulfilling it (tawahhum al-birr), which the ghamūs lacks; but "the meaning in the root is not yours but X" is a claim that reaches the dispute only by absence, though it may serve for preference. (v2/237) → B13d.04

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B15.03 · القلب · Reversal: making the effect the cause defeats a reasoning (taʿlīl) from ruling to ruling; equal rulings can instead support mutual inference (istidlāl); turning the opponent's feature into a witness against him is opposition with contradiction (v2/238–240)

• Meaning: turning a thing upside down, or inside out. (v2/238)
• Kind 1: making the caused the cause, which voids it. al-Shāfiʿī: a dhimmī is stoned, "being of those whose unmarried are flogged a hundred", like a Muslim; reversed: the unmarried are flogged because the married are stoned. Likewise "recitation repeats as obligatory in the first two rakʿas, so in the last two, like bowing". It arises only when a ruling is reasoned from a ruling. The way out: present it as inference from one ruling to its equal, the method of the salaf, as twins show each other's free or slave status. So: "fasting binds by vow, so by starting, like ḥajj" (both are extra worship purely for God that may not be abandoned once begun); "whoever is under guardianship in property is under it in marriage" (the young previously married girl), and "whoever is not, is not" (the adult virgin), both resting on need and inability. His examples fail for lack of equality: stoning and flogging differ in nature and conditions; recitation and bowing differ (bowing is the root of a rakʿa; recitation falls for the follower (in our view) and, by agreement, for one who fears missing the rakʿa); the last two rakʿas drop the sūra and loud reciting. (v2/238–239)
• Kind 2: making the opponent's feature witness for the other side: «وَهَذِه مُعَارضَة فِيهَا مناقضة» (v2/240) — "this is an opposition that contains a contradiction", like a witness testifying for both parties in one case; opposition by another cause, by contrast, has no contradiction, only ambiguity until one is preferred. al-Shāfiʿī: "Ramaḍān is an obligatory fast, so it needs a specified intention, like the make-up"; reversed: "an obligatory fast, so once specified it needs no further specification, like the make-up". The head-wipe likewise. Objection → Reply: "it adds a feature, so it is opposition, not reversal." Reply: the addition explains the ruling and confirms it, it does not change it: «صَوْم رَمَضَان لما تعين مَشْرُوعا فِي الزَّمَان وَغَيره لَيْسَ بمشروع كَانَ قِيَاسه من الْقَضَاء مَا بعد التَّعْيِين بِالشُّرُوعِ فِيهِ» (v2/240) — "since the Ramaḍān fast is already designated as what is legislated in that time, and nothing else is, its counterpart among make-up fasts is the make-up after it has been designated by starting it"; likewise, since covering the whole head is not the pillar, its counterpart in washed limbs is completion by addition after full coverage. (v2/240)

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B15.04 · العكس · Inversion: the reverse of concomitance supports a cause; the inversion that yields a contrary ruling is a weak objection (v2/241–242)

• Meaning: returning a thing back along its path, like a mirror or water reflecting the sun. (v2/241)
• Kind 1: the ruling's reverse with the cause's reverse ("what binds by vow binds by starting, like ḥajj; what does not bind by vow does not bind by starting, like wuḍūʾ"): no objection at all; it can make a cause preferred. Kind 2: al-Shāfiʿī: "fasting is a worship one does not continue once spoiled, so it does not bind by starting, like wuḍūʾ; the reverse is ḥajj"; or against us: "then starting it as voluntary should equal starting it thinking it was owed, like ḥajj". This breaks the cause a little, «وَلكنه لَيْسَ بِقَوي» (v2/241) — "but it is not strong": its ruling is vague and ours explicit; the equality it claims runs in opposite directions (in the root both starts entail make-up; in the branch, for him, neither does); it states a new ruling, which the questioner may not do. (v2/241–242)

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B15.05 · المعارضة · Opposition to the branch's ruling has five forms (two sound, one weak, two unsound); opposition by another cause in the root is always unsound (v2/242–246)

• In the branch: (1) stating the opposite ruling in the same place (head-wipe: "a pillar, so tripling it is sunna" vs "a wiping, so tripling it is not sunna"), sound; (2) a change that explains and confirms the ruling ("a pillar, so once completed beyond the obligatory part in the obligatory place, tripling it is not sunna"), sound; both lead to preference. (3) a change that misses the point of dispute (the orphan's guardian: "she is young, so guardianship over her, like one with a father" vs "so no guardianship for the brother"): the dispute is whether guardianship exists, not who holds it; it has some validity, though not strong, on the opponent's defence that the brother is the nearest and those behind him fall with him; (4) denying what was not affirmed or affirming what was not denied (a kāfir buying a Muslim slave, "property a kāfir may sell, so he may buy it": "then buying and keeping should be equal"), unsound, since the questioner may not build that equality; (5) a ruling in another place: Abū Ḥanīfa: when a wife told of her husband's death remarries and bears children, and the first husband returns, he is their father (valid bed); ⚑ the two (هما): the present husband's bed (like a marriage without witnesses); the invalid bed is another place, and Abū Ḥanīfa replies: "a thing is abrogated only by its like or stronger". (v2/242–244)
• In the root: «فَأَما وُجُوه الْمُعَارضَة فِي عِلّة الأَصْل فَهِيَ فَاسِدَة كلهَا» (v2/244) — "the forms of opposition in the root's cause are all unsound": a root may have two causes; a non-extending cause is void; one extending to an agreed branch reaches the dispute only by absence; one extending to a disputed branch is weaker still. Some call it a good opposition containing denial (only one of "measured" and "food" can be the ribā cause, so proving one voids the other); we: the two are not incompatible, and a cause is voided only by showing its flaw. (v2/244–245)
• Recasting distinguishing as denial: pledge and manumission (the opponent: "it voids the creditor's right, so it fails without consent, like sale"): the ṭard reply distinguishes (sale can be undone, manumission not); the fiqh reply denies: his reasoning changes the root's ruling (sale is suspended, not void), and the root's real ruling cannot be carried to manumission. If he takes the sick man's manumission as root instead, that is not void for us either; its ruling is deferral of the bequest behind debts, which his reasoning cannot establish in the branch. Deliberate killing (the opponent: "killing a guaranteed human, so money is owed, like mistaken killing"): money in the root is a substitute for the original, so reasoning that makes it original in the branch changes the root's ruling. (v2/245–246)

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B15.06 · دفع المناقضة · A counter-case hits only ṭard causes; the answer reconciles in four ways: by the feature's wording, its effect, the ruling sought, or the aim of the reasoning (v2/246–249)

• Position: counter-cases do not hit effective causes, but one must know how to answer them. «وَالْحَاصِل فِيهِ أَن الْمُجيب مَتى وفْق بَين مَا ذكر من الْعلَّة وَبَين مَا يُورد نقضا عَلَيْهَا بِتَوْفِيق بَين فَإِنَّهُ ينْدَفع النَّقْض عَنهُ» (v2/246) — "In short: when the answerer clearly reconciles his cause with the counter-case, the counter-case falls", as with apparent contradictions between claim and testimony before a qāḍī; if he cannot reconcile, the counter-case binds him. (v2/246)
• Four ways: (1) the wording: "a wiping" does not cover stone-cleansing (removing impurity; water after stones is better, unlike a wiped limb); "an impure exiting thing (khārij najis), so a ḥadath" does not cover blood that did not flow, since khārij means leaving its place (under every spot of skin is moisture and in every vein blood, so when the skin peels back what shows is exposed, not out; this clause is recovered from the second witness), as one in a house whose wall is removed is exposed, not "out"; (2) the effect: wiping is a purity not understood rationally and built on lightening, while stone-cleansing removes impurity and must cover the whole place; an impure exit requires washing that place, which unflowed blood does not; so the ruling fails for want of the cause, which supports the cause; (3) the ruling sought: "the Day of Sacrifice is a day, so a fast vow can be attached to it" is not broken by a menstruation day, since the vow for tomorrow is valid and fails only by being attached to menstruation; the mukātab ("the kitāba contract is open to cancellation", so it does not stop the neck being fit for expiation; the element of exchange is what stops it; some dialecticians put this as "a reasoning about the whole is not broken by a single case"); (4) the aim: the mustaḥāḍa's blood is ḥadath with its effect delayed to the end of the time (this first answer Sarakhsī counts under way 3), and, under way 4, the aim is equality with the root, since constant flow from the usual path also acts only after the time; amīn is said quietly like other remembrances, and the imam's loud takbīrs and the adhān are loud to inform, not as remembrance. (v2/246–249)
• [Editorial] Debate note: B15 is Sarakhsī's rulebook for disputation. His practical advice: against an effective cause, deny (mumānaʿa), above all by asking for the effect, rather than distinguishing root from branch; note that the bāb lists "the breaking inversion" among the four sound objections (v2/233) yet ends by calling inversion a weak question (v2/242); and when faced with a counter-case, reconcile it by wording, effect, ruling or aim.

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