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B12 · باب الكلام في أفعال النبي وما يتصل به · The Prophet's acts and ijtihād; earlier prophets' law; the Companion's opinion; the Follower in consensus; consensus does not carry over to a changed case (v2/86–118)

1. B12.01 · أفعال النبي · ⚑ An intentional act of the Prophet (not a slip, not from forgetfulness, not from human nature) whose legal grade is unknown: al-Karkhī, the act is permitted for him and our following it waits for proof; al-Jaṣṣāṣ (sound), following him is permitted to us until proof that it was his alone (v2/86–90)
2. B12.02 · اجتهاد النبي · The Prophet waited for revelation, then, if none came, judged by ijtihād; when left uncorrected, his ijtihād is certain proof (v2/90–96)
3. B12.03 · فعله الموافق للكتاب · An act or word of the Prophet that matches the Qurʾān is taken as derived from it, not as a new ruling (v2/96–98)
4. B12.04 · الزمان والمكان في الفعل المبين · When his act explains the Qurʾān, the explanation lies in the act, not in its time or place, unless the text itself is unclear about them (as with prayer), against al-Shāfiʿī (v2/98–99)
5. B12.05 · شرائع من قبلنا · Earlier prophets' law binds us as our Prophet's law, unless abrogated, but only when known through the Qurʾān or the Prophet (v2/99–105)
6. B12.06 · قول الصحابي · ⚑ Where no Companion is known to differ, a single Companion's opinion outweighs qiyās (al-Bardaʿī, the sounder view), against al-Karkhī; our imams' practice is mixed; our early and later colleagues all agree it is proof where qiyās has no role (v2/105–113)
7. B12.07 · أصحابنا المتمسكون بالسنة والرأي · Sarakhsī's claim: "our colleagues" hold to Sunna and opinion together more than those who claim ḥadīth; his charge against al-Shāfiʿī (v2/113)
8. B12.08 · خلاف التابعي · A Follower who reached the Companions' age as one of its scholars and mujtahids counts in their consensus, against al-Shāfiʿī (v2/114–116)
9. B12.09 · حدوث الخلاف بعد الإجماع · When a new feature arises in a case, the earlier consensus does not carry over (no istiṣḥāb of consensus), against some scholars (v2/116–118)

B12.01 · أفعال النبي · ⚑ An intentional act of the Prophet (not a slip, not from forgetfulness, not from human nature) whose legal grade is unknown: al-Karkhī, the act is permitted for him and our following it waits for proof; al-Jaṣṣāṣ (sound), following him is permitted to us until proof that it was his alone (v2/86–90)

• His intentional acts are permitted, recommended, obligatory or farḍ; a slip (zalla) is not followed, since it always comes with a clarification (bayān) (Mūsā and the Copt, Q 28:15; Ādam, Q 20:121). (v2/86)
• Scope: the dispute covers his acts «الَّتِي لَا تكون عَن سَهْو وَلَا من نتيجة الطَّبْع على مَا جبل عَلَيْهِ الْإِنْسَان» (v2/86) — "that are not from forgetfulness nor the product of the nature man is created with"; acts in sleep or unconsciousness lack intent and fall outside it. (v2/86)
• Who: some: suspend until proof; some: follow him in everything unless proof excludes it (Q 33:21; 3:31; 7:157; 24:63). ⚑ al-Karkhī: if the act's grade is known, follow it with that grade; if not, only permissibility is established, and following needs proof. al-Jaṣṣāṣ held al-Karkhī's view, «إِلَّا أَنه يَقُول إِذا لم يعلم فالاتباع لَهُ فِي ذَلِك ثَابت حَتَّى يقوم الدَّلِيل على كَونه مَخْصُوصًا وَهَذَا هُوَ الصَّحِيح» (v2/87) — "except that he says: if it is not known, following him in it stands until proof shows it was particular to him; and this is the sound view." (v2/86–87)
• The suspenders' case: when his act's grade is unclear, matching him is impossible, since doing as obligatory what he did as voluntary «يكون ذَلِك مُنَازعَة لَا مُوَافقَة» (v2/87) — "would be contention, not conformity" (like the sorcerers imitating Moses). (v2/87)
• Replies: Sarakhsī calls this "false on reflection": suspension collapses into either forbidding or permitting. Against "always follow": he asked "why did you take off your sandals?"; he stopped the tarāwīḥ "for fear it would be prescribed"; he abstained from wine while it was lawful, which obliged no one; and no one could shadow him day and night. "In the Messenger of God you have a good example" says "you have", not "upon you", «فَفِي قَوْله ﴿لكم﴾ دَلِيل على أَن ذَلِك مُبَاح لنا لَا أَن يكون لَازِما علينا» — "'for you' shows it is permitted to us, not binding on us." (v2/88)
• Against al-Karkhī's suspension: Q 33:37 ("so that there be no hardship for the believers") shows his lawfulness is ours; "exclusively for you" (Q 33:50) would be pointless otherwise; Ibn Rawāḥa ("have you not an example in me?") and Umm Salama's question on kissing while fasting, where the Prophet replied "I hope to be the most God-fearing of you and the most knowing of His limits". Prophets are leaders to follow (Q 2:124), so any particularity must be stated with the act. (v2/89–90)

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B12.02 · اجتهاد النبي · The Prophet waited for revelation, then, if none came, judged by ijtihād; when left uncorrected, his ijtihād is certain proof (v2/90–96)

• Revelation: outward (the angel's speech; the angel's prompting: "the Holy Spirit breathed into my heart…") and inward (a light in the heart that settles the question, Q 4:105). Like revelation: his inference from texts, since he was never left in error. (v2/90–91)
• Who: some deny that he used ijtihād: Q 53:3–4; 10:15; and opinion can err, as the Companions differed with him on Badr's wells, the offer of half Medina's fruit at al-Aḥzāb and palm pollination ("you know better the affairs of your world"); only one far from the Kaʿba may search for the qibla; and he set rulings from the start, which opinion cannot do, since God's right is established from the start only by what yields certain knowledge. Others: he used revelation sometimes and opinion sometimes. (v2/91–92)
• Position: «وَأَصَح الْأَقَاوِيل عندنَا أَنه فِيمَا كَانَ يبتلى بِهِ من الْحَوَادِث الَّتِي لَيْسَ فِيهَا وَحي منزل كَانَ ينْتَظر الْوَحْي إِلَى أَن تمْضِي مُدَّة الِانْتِظَار ثمَّ كَانَ يعْمل بِالرَّأْيِ وَالِاجْتِهَاد وَيبين الحكم بِهِ» (v2/91) — "The soundest view, for us: in cases with no revealed text he waited for revelation until the waiting period passed, then acted by opinion and ijtihād and stated the ruling by it"; when left uncorrected, it was certain proof. The condition: he waited until he no longer hoped for revelation on it, as when he feared the matter would be lost, as the traveller who hopes for water seeks it before tayammum. (v2/91–96)
• Proofs (the text's «وَالْحجّة لِلْقَوْلِ الثَّانِي» (v2/93), which Sarakhsī's own view builds on): "take heed, O people of insight" (Q 59:2); "those who draw it out" (Q 4:83); Sulaymān's understanding (Q 21:79) and Dāwūd's analogy (Q 38:24); "if your father owed a debt…" (the Khathʿamī woman); rinsing the mouth and the fasting kiss; reward in marital intimacy; consultation (Q 3:159), the Badr captives (Q 8:68), the adhān dream accepted ("this is firmer"). His consulting was real, not courtesy. (v2/93–95)
• Opinion not confirmed, with reproach: "God has pardoned you: why did you give them leave?" (Q 9:43); "he frowned" (Q 80:1). Not confirmed, without reproach: Banū Qurayẓa (Jibrīl came after he laid down his arms); Barāʾa, first given to Abū Bakr, then to ʿAlī. Khawla's case (Q 58:1) shows he gave a fatwā by opinion and revelation then corrected it. Since his opinion is left in place only if right, a confirmed opinion yields certain knowledge. Q 53:3 concerns the Qurʾān or the self's desire, which opinion is not. (v2/95–96)

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B12.03 · فعله الموافق للكتاب · An act or word of the Prophet that matches the Qurʾān is taken as derived from it, not as a new ruling (v2/96–98)

• Position: «فَإِذا كَانَ ذَلِك ظَاهرا مَعْلُوما فِي الْوَحْي المتلو عرفنَا أَنه صادر عَن ذَلِك» (v2/97) — "when it is manifestly known in the recited revelation, we know it proceeds from that." Our scholars: when the Prophet's act or word matches the Qurʾān, it is taken as issuing from the Qurʾān and explaining it; al-Shāfiʿī's followers: a new ruling unless shown otherwise. (v2/96–97)
• Furūʿ test: his teaching tayammum for the junub issues from Q 5:6, which shows "or you have touched women" means intercourse; they take it as a new ruling and read the verse as touching by hand. (v2/96–97)
• Proof: his word and act in law come from revelation (Q 53:4); where recited revelation already has it, positing an unrecited one is needless. The Companions took his cutting of the thief's hand and his prayer times as obligatory without asking, knowing they came from the verses. Their two arguments fail: the outward sense is that it issues from the Qurʾān, so their "possibility" falls; and "extra benefit" would need positing a revelation on doubt, with no need for it. (v2/97–98)

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B12.04 · الزمان والمكان في الفعل المبين · When his act explains the Qurʾān, the explanation lies in the act, not in its time or place, unless the text itself is unclear about them (as with prayer), against al-Shāfiʿī (v2/98–99)

• Position: «فالبيان يكون وَاقعا بِفِعْلِهِ وَبِمَا هُوَ من صِفَاته عِنْد الْفِعْل فَأَما الْمَكَان وَالزَّمَان لَا يكون شرطا فِيهِ» — "the explanation lies in his act and in its attributes at the time of the act; the place and time are not conditions", unless the text itself is unclear about time or place (as with prayer). (v2/98)
• Furūʿ test: his iḥrām for ḥajj in the ḥajj months does not make them a condition, so iḥrām before them is valid; his two rakʿas of ṭawāf at the Maqām do not tie them to that spot. al-Shāfiʿī makes the time a condition (and the place, on one view), arguing from constant practice. Compare wuḍūʾ within the prayer time, which does not bar it before the time. (v2/98–99)

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B12.05 · شرائع من قبلنا · Earlier prophets' law binds us as our Prophet's law, unless abrogated, but only when known through the Qurʾān or the Prophet (v2/99–105)

• Who: (1) a prophet's law lasts until abrogated, as his law; (2) it ends with the next prophet unless confirmed; (3) it binds us as our Prophet's law, however it is known. (v2/99)
  • Group 1: «صفة الْإِطْلَاق فِي الشَّيْء يَقْتَضِي التَّأْبِيد فِيهِ إِذا كَانَ مُحْتملا للتأبيد» (v2/100) — "an unqualified ruling implies permanence where permanence is possible", so a time limit needs proof; a messenger stays a messenger when another is sent, so his law stays in force until abrogated; what was pleasing to God stays pleasing. (v2/100–101)
  • Group 2: "to each of you We gave a law" (Q 5:48); the Torah "a guidance for the Children of Israel" (Q 17:2); a new messenger is sent for what needs explaining, so his sending signals abrogation; most earlier prophets were sent to their own people only. And had earlier laws stayed in force the Prophet would have taught them, «وَالْمَنْقُول إِلَيْنَا مَنعه إيَّاهُم عَن ذَلِك» (v2/102) — "what is transmitted to us is his forbidding them that": seeing a Torah sheet in ʿUmar's hand, he grew angry and said "had Mūsā lived, he would have had no choice but to follow me". (v2/101–102)
  • Group 3 uses that same saying the other way: what was law for those before us has become our Prophet's law, so an earlier prophet acting by it would be following him. Sarakhsī's sound view (below) takes this transfer and limits the source to the Qurʾān or the Prophet's statement. (v2/102–104)
• Position: «وَأَصَح الْأَقَاوِيل عندنَا أَن مَا ثَبت بِكِتَاب الله أَنه كَانَ شَرِيعَة من قبلنَا أَو بِبَيَان من رَسُول الله» (v2/99) — "the soundest view, for us: what is established by the Book of God, or by the Messenger's statement, as the law of those before us" binds us as our Prophet's law until abrogated; not what the People of the Book transmit or what Muslims read in their books, since they are known to have altered their books, so the item may be among the altered parts. (v2/99–104)
• Our scholars' practice: Muḥammad (K. al-Shurb) argued for turn-based water shares from Ṣāliḥ's she-camel (Q 54:28; 26:155); Abū Yūsuf for retaliation between man and woman from Q 5:45, and al-Karkhī for free and slave, Muslim and dhimmī. al-Shāfiʿī agrees here: he cites the Prophet stoning the two Jews by the Torah. We hold that the addition of iḥṣān in our law abrogated that. (v2/99–100)
• Proofs for the sound view: "follow their guidance" (Q 6:90), which covers laws too (Mujāhid on the prostration of Ṣād: "Dāwūd prostrated, and he is among those your Prophet was told to follow"); "the religion of your father Ibrāhīm" (Q 22:78; 3:95); "He ordained for you of religion what He enjoined on Nūḥ" (Q 42:13); those who do not judge by what God sent down are called unbelievers, wrongdoers and sinners (Q 5:44–47), and «مَا كَانُوا يمتنعون من الْعَمَل بِأَحْكَام التَّوْرَاة وَإِنَّمَا كَانُوا يمتنعون من الْعَمَل بِهِ على طَرِيق أَنه شَرِيعَة رَسُولنَا» (v2/105) — "they did not refuse to act on the Torah's rulings; they refused to act on them as our Messenger's law", since they denied his mission; so those rulings have become our Prophet's law. Objection: Q 6:90 concerns only the roots of religion. Reply: "guidance" covers laws too (Q 2:2; 5:44), our own law also has abrogation, and "We chose them and guided them" fixes whom it means. Replies to group 2: Q 5:48 speaks of difference only in what was abrogated; "a guidance for the Children of Israel" (Q 17:2) does not exclude others, as "guidance for the God-fearing" does not; and he sought out the Torah's stoning ruling. Their law passes to us like property from the one who leaves it to the heir (Q 35:32). (v2/100–105)

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B12.06 · قول الصحابي · ⚑ Where no Companion is known to differ, a single Companion's opinion outweighs qiyās (al-Bardaʿī, the sounder view), against al-Karkhī; our imams' practice is mixed; our early and later colleagues all agree it is proof where qiyās has no role (v2/105–113)

• Who: the faṣl is on a Companion's opinion «إِذا قَالَ قولا وَلَا يعرف لَهُ مُخَالف» — "when he says something and no one is known to differ". al-Bardaʿī, as Abū ʿAmr b. Dānīkā al-Ṭabarī reports: «قَول الْوَاحِد من الصَّحَابَة مقدم على الْقيَاس يتْرك الْقيَاس بقوله وعَلى هَذَا أدركنا مَشَايِخنَا» — "the opinion of one Companion takes precedence over qiyās, and qiyās is left for it; so we found our shaykhs." al-Karkhī, as Abū Bakr al-Rāzī (al-Jaṣṣāṣ) reports: Abū Yūsuf says in some of his questions "qiyās is so, but I left it for a report (athar)", meaning a Companion's opinion; yet «قَالَ وَأما أَنا فَلَا يُعجبنِي هَذَا الْمَذْهَب» — "as for me, this doctrine does not please me." (v2/105)
• The imams' practice (Sarakhsī: this is found in many questions of our colleagues): rinsing mouth and nose in ghusl (Ibn ʿAbbās); blood on a wound (Ibn ʿAbbās); a day-and-night unconsciousness (ʿAmmār); a sick man's admission for an heir (Ibn ʿUmar); the "if he does not pay in three days" sale (Abū Ḥanīfa and Abū Yūsuf, Ibn ʿUmar). ⚑ Abū Ḥanīfa required naming the amount of a salam capital where the contract turns on its quantity (from Ibn ʿUmar), the Ṣāḥibān left it by opinion; ⚑ when the entrusted item is lost in the common hireling's hands through something he could have guarded against, the Ṣāḥibān make him liable (from ʿAlī), Abū Ḥanīfa does not, by opinion; ⚑ Muḥammad: no more than one sunna divorce for a pregnant woman (Ibn Masʿūd, Jābir), Abū Ḥanīfa and Abū Yūsuf: three, by opinion. «فَعرفنَا أَن عمل عُلَمَائِنَا بِهَذَا فِي مسائلهم مُخْتَلف» (v2/106) — "so we know our scholars' practice on this varies." (v2/105–106)
• Who: al-Shāfiʿī: old view, the Companion's opinion first (also Mālik's); new view, qiyās first (like al-Karkhī). Some ḥadīth scholars: only the rightly guided caliphs ("hold to my sunna and the caliphs'"; "follow the two after me"). Sarakhsī: their outward sense is left, by proof, where a dispute among the Companions appears; where the two caliphs speak with no opponent, it stands. (v2/106)
• al-Karkhī's case: Q 59:2; Q 4:59; Muʿādh's ḥadīth (Book, Sunna, then opinion); "my Companions are like stars" means following their method; Companions ruled by opinion and could err (ʿUmar: "by God, ʿUmar does not know whether this is right"; Ibn Masʿūd: "if wrong, it is from me and Satan"); they never called people to their own opinions, and they differed. Reply: they could differ with each other because they were equals in what strengthens opinion; once one of them spoke «وانقرض عصرهم قبل أَن يظْهر قَول بِخِلَافِهِ من غَيره» (v2/110) — "and their age ended before a contrary view appeared from anyone else", that possibility is gone and his word is proof. (v2/106–110)
• Position: «وَجه مَا ذهب إِلَيْهِ أَبُو سعيد البردعي وَهُوَ الْأَصَح أَن فَتْوَى الصَّحَابِيّ فِيهِ احْتِمَال الرِّوَايَة عَمَّن ينزل عَلَيْهِ الْوَحْي» (v2/108) — "the case for Abū Saʿīd al-Bardaʿī's view, which is the sounder: a Companion's fatwā carries the possibility of being a report from the one to whom revelation came", like a single report over qiyās. And if it is opinion, theirs is stronger: they saw the occasions and the Prophet's way of ruling. ⚑ Abū Ḥanīfa: a mujtahid leaves his view for a contemporary he holds to be stronger in ijtihād; the Ṣāḥibān: not among contemporaries, since they are equals; «وَلَكِن هَذَا لَا يُوجد فِيمَا بَين الْمُجْتَهد منا والمجتهد من الصَّحَابَة» (v2/108) — "but that is not found between a mujtahid of ours and a mujtahid among the Companions": the gap is plain. The Companion's advantage is not in reading texts (language), but in judging by them. (v2/108–110)
• Agreed: «وَلَا خلاف بَين أَصْحَابنَا الْمُتَقَدِّمين والمتأخرين أَن قَول الْوَاحِد من الصَّحَابَة حجَّة فِيمَا لَا مدْخل للْقِيَاس فِي معرفَة الحكم فِيهِ» (v2/110) — "No disagreement among our early and later colleagues: a single Companion's opinion is proof where qiyās has no way to the ruling": amounts (ʿAlī: minimum dower ten dirhams; Anas: menstruation three to ten days; ʿUthmān b. Abī al-ʿĀṣ: postpartum up to forty days; ʿĀʾisha: gestation not beyond two years), since there the fatwā can only come from hearing. Sarakhsī's own inference from this («وَلِهَذَا قُلْنَا» (v2/110), "hence we said"): an opinion against qiyās is proof too, as it shows hearing (ʿĀʾisha on Zayd b. Arqam's resale; Ibn ʿAbbās on vowing to slaughter one's child; Ibn Masʿūd on the runaway's reward). (v2/110–111)
• Objections → Replies: a Follower's opinion too cannot be a lie. Reply: a Companion's link to hearing is direct; a Follower's needs an unproven intermediary. "Abū Ḥanīfa set amounts by opinion (puberty at 18 or 17; the prodigal's property at 25; the Ṣāḥibān's 40 days to deny a child; 20 buckets for the well)." Reply: those settle a range between little and much (like value or fair dower), not amounts fixed as God's right from the start; the well is from ʿAlī and Abū Saʿīd. (v2/111–112)
• A Companion's opinion that spread without objection is consensus; where they differed, no view outside theirs, no dating for abrogation between opinions: if one view has added strength, acting on it is required; if not, the one facing the case chooses «بعد أَن يَقع فِي أَكثر رَأْيه أَنه هُوَ الصَّوَاب» (v2/113) — "after it becomes his predominant view that it is right", and «وَبعد مَا عمل بِأحد الْقَوْلَيْنِ لَا يكون لَهُ أَن يعْمل بالْقَوْل الآخر إِلَّا بِدَلِيل» (v2/113) — "once he has acted on one of the two views, he may not act on the other except by proof." (v2/112–113)

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B12.07 · أصحابنا المتمسكون بالسنة والرأي · Sarakhsī's claim: "our colleagues" hold to Sunna and opinion together more than those who claim ḥadīth; his charge against al-Shāfiʿī (v2/113)

• Muḥammad (Adab al-qāḍī): "working by ḥadīth is not sound without opinion, nor opinion without ḥadīth." (v2/113)
• Position: «وأصحابنا هم المتمسكون بِالسنةِ والرأي فِي الْحَقِيقَة» — "Our colleagues are, in truth, those who hold to the Sunna and to opinion": they allowed abrogation of the Kitāb by the Sunna, because of its rank, act on mursal reports, put the unknown narrator's report and the Companion's opinion before qiyās, and only then use sound qiyās. (v2/113)
• His charge, graded in three steps: by rejecting mursal reports al-Shāfiʿī "left many sunnas"; by rejecting the unknown narrator he "left some of the Sunna idle too"; by not following a single Companion he "allowed turning away from what may have been heard". Then he used qiyās al-shabah, which cannot ground an obligation: "he is like one who rejects qiyās altogether and then acts on istiṣḥāb", so "his caution led him to act without proof and to leave acting on proof". Sarakhsī closes that our colleagues are the model in roots and branches, "but it is a deep sea that not every swimmer can cross". (v2/113)
• [Editorial] Debate note: this is Sarakhsī's polemic, and it rests on the specific positions listed (B8.05, B9d.S2, B9b.04, B11.06, B12.06). When the "Ḥanafīs and ḥadīth" charge comes up, the useful move is to cite these positions one by one, not the slogan.

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B12.08 · خلاف التابعي · A Follower who reached the Companions' age as one of its scholars and mujtahids counts in their consensus, against al-Shāfiʿī (v2/114–116)

• A Follower's opinion does not override qiyās (Abū Ḥanīfa: "the Followers, we compete with them"); one who did not reach their age does not count in their consensus. (v2/114)
• Position: for one who did (al-Ḥasan, Ibn al-Musayyab, al-Nakhaʿī, al-Shaʿbī): «فَإِنَّهُ يعْتد بقوله فِي إِجْمَاعهم عندنَا حَتَّى لَا يتم إِجْمَاعهم مَعَ خِلَافه» — "his view counts in their consensus, in our view, so that their consensus is not complete with his dissent." Hence Abū Ḥanīfa: no Companion consensus on marking sacrificial camels (ishʿār), since al-Nakhaʿī disliked it. al-Shāfiʿī: consensus is an honour for the Companions alone; a Follower's word is not proof as theirs is; and "my Companions are like stars". (v2/114)
• Proofs: they allowed such Followers to judge by their own opinion: ʿUmar and ʿAlī appointed Shurayḥ (who ruled against ʿAlī on a son's testimony), ʿUmar's letter "then use your opinion"; Ibn ʿAbbās came round to Masrūq on the child vow; Kaʿb b. Sūr's ruling; Abū Hurayra sided with Abū Salama; Ibn ʿUmar: "ask Saʿīd b. Jubayr"; Anas: "ask our master al-Ḥasan". Objection: ʿUmar's "use your opinion" means within our opinions. Reply: that adds to the text, which counts as abrogation, so it is no interpretation. «فَعرفنَا أَن هَذَا الحكم إِنَّمَا يبتنى على كَونه من عُلَمَاء الْعَصْر» (v2/115) — "so this ruling rests on his being one of the scholars of the age", a mujtahid whose word counts: Companionship is not the criterion (Bedouin Companions did not count). The caliphs' higher rank did not make consensus complete without the others. (v2/114–116)

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B12.09 · حدوث الخلاف بعد الإجماع · When a new feature arises in a case, the earlier consensus does not carry over (no istiṣḥāb of consensus), against some scholars (v2/116–118)

• Position: «فمذهب عُلَمَائِنَا أَن الِاتِّفَاق مَتى حصل فِي شَيْء على حكم ثمَّ حدث فِيهِ معنى اخْتلفُوا لأَجله فِي حكمه فالإجماع الْمُتَقَدّم لَا يكون حجَّة فِيهِ» — "Our scholars' doctrine: when there was agreement on a thing's ruling, then a new feature arose over which they differ, the earlier consensus is no proof for it." Some scholars: it remains proof until a new consensus, since a thing is not lifted by what is below it, and dispute is below consensus. (v2/116)
• Examples: water with impurity that changed none of its qualities; the tayammum-user who sees water during prayer; the umm walad's sale. Their proof: "certainty is not removed by doubt" (the doubter of ḥadath, of the number of rakʿas, of divorce, of a debt). (v2/116–117)

• Reply: is the proof the consensus itself, or the evidence it grew from? Consensus was on the thing for a reason, and the new feature was never covered by it; the argument also turns against them (the ḥadath was certain before using the water, and so on); where a proof exists for the new case (the believing emigrant woman, Q 60:10), one acts on it. The same holds for the general: the mustaʾman who spies cannot be killed by citing "kill the polytheists". (v2/117–118)

• [Editorial] Debate note (bāb): B12.06 is the Ḥanafī basis for "the Companion's opinion over qiyās", and Sarakhsī himself shows the imams' practice was mixed and al-Karkhī dissented. Cite al-Bardaʿī's view as "the sounder" in Sarakhsī's judgement, with the agreed core (matters where qiyās has no role).

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