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B11 · باب النسخ جوازا وتفسيرا · Abrogation: explaining a ruling's term; its locus, condition, agents and kinds; addition to a text is abrogation in meaning (v2/53–86)

1. B11.01 · معنى النسخ · For the Lawgiver abrogation is pure explanation of a ruling's term; for us it is replacement ("tabdīl"), with no suggestion of God changing His mind (v2/53–54)
2. B11.02 · جواز النسخ · Abrogation is possible in legislated commands and prohibitions that may hold or not (not in matters of belief, B11.03), against the Jews (by reason or by transmission) and a few Muslims (v2/54–58)
3. B11.03 · محل النسخ · The locus is only the unqualified legislated ruling, equally open to being timed or permanent; not belief in God, not the meaning of reports, not what is made permanent or timed by text (v2/59–62)
4. B11.04 · نسخ الأخف بالأثقل · A lighter ruling may be abrogated by a heavier one, and the reverse (v2/62–63)
5. B11.05 · شرط النسخ · Abrogation needs only the possibility of believing the ruling, not of acting on it, against the Muʿtazila (v2/63–65)
6. B11.06 · الناسخ · Qiyās and consensus do not abrogate; the Kitāb may be abrogated by a mutawātir or mashhūr sunna and the Sunna by the Kitāb, against al-Shāfiʿī (v2/65–78)
7. B11.07 · وجوه النسخ · Recitation and ruling together (only in the Prophet's life); ruling without recitation; recitation without ruling (v2/78–81)
8. B11.08 · الزيادة على النص · An addition that changes what suffices under an unqualified text (in God's rights, or any indivisible right) is explanation in form and abrogation in meaning, so it cannot come by a single report or qiyās, against al-Shāfiʿī (v2/82–86)

B11.01 · معنى النسخ · For the Lawgiver abrogation is pure explanation of a ruling's term; for us it is replacement ("tabdīl"), with no suggestion of God changing His mind (v2/53–54)

• Transfer, voiding and removal are all figurative senses of "naskh"; the term is legal, known from Q 2:106, and the most apt gloss is "replacement" (tabdīl, Q 16:101). (v2/53–54)
• Who: ⚑ some author among our shaykhs found "tabdīl" far-fetched as suggesting badāʾ (God changing His mind). Sarakhsī: «وَعِنْدِي أَن هَذَا سَهْو مِنْهُ وَعبارَة التبديل مَنْصُوص عَلَيْهِ فِي الْقُرْآن» — "To me this is an oversight on his part; the word 'replacement' is stated in the Qurʾān." (v2/54)
• Position: «فَكَانَ النّسخ بَيَانا لمُدَّة الحكم الْمَنْسُوخ فِي حق الشَّارِع وتبديلا لذَلِك الحكم بِحكم آخر فِي حَقنا» — "Abrogation is an explanation of the term of the abrogated ruling as regards the Lawgiver, and a replacement of that ruling by another as regards us", like a killing: for God it is the victim's appointed term, for the killer a crime. (v2/54)

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B11.02 · جواز النسخ · Abrogation is possible in legislated commands and prohibitions that may hold or not (not in matters of belief, B11.03), against the Jews (by reason or by transmission) and a few Muslims (v2/54–58)

• Position: «ثمَّ الْمَذْهَب عِنْد الْمُسلمين أَن النّسخ جَائِز فِي الْأَمر وَالنَّهْي الَّذِي يجوز أَن يكون ثَابتا وَيجوز أَن لَا يكون» — "The Muslims' doctrine: abrogation is possible in command and prohibition that could either hold or not." (v2/54)
• Who: the Jews deny it, some by reason (a thing cannot be good and bad; that would be badāʾ; an unqualified command implies permanence), some by transmission (Moses: "hold to the Sabbath as long as heaven and earth last"). Some Muslims "not counted" deny it or say it never occurred. (v2/54–55)
• Proofs: Q 2:106 and 16:101; the qibla change. Marriage of siblings in Ādam's law, later forbidden; Yaʿqūb's self-prohibition (Q 3:93); work on the Sabbath lawful before Moses. By reason: rulings are tests whose benefit varies with times and people (like fasting by day and not by night); and a command establishes a ruling without requiring it to last, as creating a person does not require him to live forever. (v2/55–57)
• Objections → Replies: "then a ruling's continuance before its abrogator appears is not certain." Reply: in the Prophet's life it rests on the prior state (like a missing person's life), and the old ruling binds even after the abrogator comes down, until the addressee learns of it; after his death it is certain, since abrogation comes only through revelation. "Then there is no abrogation of the command itself." Reply: "so we say": abrogation does not touch the command at all, only the ruling established by it, as it outwardly stood for us. "A thing cannot be good and bad." Reply: the two conflict only in one locus at one time; in two times or two loci they do not, as a child or madman is not addressed and then is once he has reason. For the Lawgiver abrogation is pure explanation; for us it is a change, because our knowledge changes. The Torah claim fails: it was altered, and not mass-transmitted after Nebuchadnezzar. (v2/57–58)

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B11.03 · محل النسخ · The locus is only the unqualified legislated ruling, equally open to being timed or permanent; not belief in God, not the meaning of reports, not what is made permanent or timed by text (v2/59–62)

• Position: «قد بَينا أَن جَوَاز النّسخ مُخْتَصّ بِمَا يجوز أَن يكون مَشْرُوعا وَيجوز أَن لَا يكون مَشْرُوعا» — "Abrogation is possible only in what may or may not be legislated", and could be timed by text. So belief in God, His books and messengers is never abrogated. (v2/59)
• Reports: «وعَلى هَذَا قَالَ جُمْهُور الْعلمَاء لَا نسخ فِي الْأَخْبَار أَيْضا» (v2/59) — "Hence most scholars say there is no abrogation in reports either", in their meaning, against "some people of deviation" who allow it in reports about the future, citing "God erases what He wills" (Q 13:39). That verse means giving life and death (al-Ḥasan) or erasing and confirming revelation (Zayd b. Aslam); the recitation of a report may lapse, not its meaning. (v2/59–60)
• Four kinds of ruling: permanent by text (Q 3:55; "forever"); permanent by indication (the law as it stood at the Prophet's death); timed by text ("I permit you this for a hundred years"); and the unqualified, which may be timed or permanent equally: the first three admit no abrogation, only this last does. (v2/60–61)
• Objection → Reply: Ibrāhīm commanded to sacrifice his son, then forbidden. Reply: not abrogation: "you have fulfilled the vision" (Q 37:105); the ram was a ransom (Q 37:107), which took the duty in the son's place, as someone steps in front of an arrow. The point was the test of both father and son. (v2/61–62)

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B11.04 · نسخ الأخف بالأثقل · A lighter ruling may be abrogated by a heavier one, and the reverse (v2/62–63)

• Position: «ثمَّ على مَذْهَب عُلَمَائِنَا يجوز نسخ الأخف بالأثقل كَمَا يجوز نسخ الأثقل بالأخف» — "On our scholars' doctrine a lighter ruling may be abrogated by a heavier, as a heavier by a lighter." (v2/62)
• Who: al-Shāfiʿī in al-Risāla: God abrogated some duties "as mercy and lightening"; some of his followers read this as the wisdom of abrogation, others as requiring the abrogator to be lighter, citing "better than it" (Q 2:106) and "now God has lightened for you" (Q 8:66). (v2/62)
• Proofs: "God erases what He wills"; benefit may lie in the heavier, as a doctor moves from food to medicine. Examples: the zinā penalty (confinement → flogging and stoning), fasting (choice with fidya → required, Q 2:184–185), wine, ḥajj made obligatory. (v2/62–63)

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B11.05 · شرط النسخ · Abrogation needs only the possibility of believing the ruling, not of acting on it, against the Muʿtazila (v2/63–65)

• Position: «اعْلَم بِأَن شَرط جَوَاز النّسخ عندنَا هُوَ التَّمَكُّن من عقد الْقلب فَأَما الْفِعْل أَو التَّمَكُّن من الْفِعْل فَلَيْسَ بِشَرْط» (v2/63) — "The condition for abrogation, in our view, is the possibility of binding the heart to it; acting, or the possibility of acting, is not a condition." The Muʿtazila require the possibility of acting, else it is badāʾ and one act would be good and bad at once. (v2/63–64)
• Proof: the fifty prayers of the Miʿrāj, reduced to five before any could be prayed, after the Prophet (the root of this community) had bound his heart to them; it was not left to his choice ("I am ashamed before my Lord"). Some cite the charity before private consultation (Q 58:12–13); the Muʿtazila answer that this came after the possibility of acting, though before the act, which all allow. Sarakhsī: «وَالأَصَح هُوَ الأول» (v2/64) — "the first is sounder", i.e. the Miʿrāj proof. The test by belief can matter more than the test by action (the mutashābih; the mujmal). (v2/64–65)

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B11.06 · الناسخ · Qiyās and consensus do not abrogate; the Kitāb may be abrogated by a mutawātir or mashhūr sunna and the Sunna by the Kitāb, against al-Shāfiʿī (v2/65–78)

• Qiyās: «وَلَا خلاف بَين جُمْهُور الْعلمَاء فِي أَنه لَا يجوز نسخ الْكتاب وَالسّنة بِالْقِيَاسِ» — "Most scholars agree that the Kitāb and Sunna are not abrogated by qiyās"; Ibn Surayj allowed it, and al-Anmāṭī allowed a qiyās drawn from the same source. Sarakhsī: "a false view by the Companions' agreement", since qiyās never yields knowledge, so it cannot abrogate what yields certain knowledge, and opinion has no way to know when a ruling's good ends (the same reason rules out consensus). The Companions dropped opinion for texts (ʿUmar on the foetus; ʿAlī on wiping the khuff). (v2/66)
• Consensus: ⚑ some of our shaykhs allow abrogation by it, as it is certain and stronger than a mashhūr; most do not, since consensus is agreement of opinion, and abrogation happens only in the Prophet's life, when consensus without him was impossible. (v2/66–67)
• Who: «فعندنا يجوز نسخ الْكتاب بِالسنةِ المتواترة أَو الْمَشْهُورَة» (v2/67) — "In our view the Kitāb may be abrogated by a mutawātir or mashhūr sunna" (al-Karkhī from Abū Yūsuf: by a report like the one on wiping the khuffs), and the Sunna by the Kitāb. al-Shāfiʿī (al-Risāla): neither; his followers differ on whether he denied the possibility or the occurrence. His proofs: Q 10:15; Q 16:44 (the Prophet explains what was sent down); "better than it or like it" (the Sunna is not like the Qurʾān); "compare what is reported from me with the Book of God"; protecting the Prophet from critics (Q 16:101–102); Q 16:89. (v2/67–69)
• Our proofs, weighed: some of our colleagues cite the bequest verse (Q 2:180) abrogated by "no bequest to an heir". Sarakhsī: «وَلَكِن هَذَا الِاسْتِدْلَال مَعَ هَذَا لَيْسَ بِقَوي» (v2/69) — "but even so this argument is not strong": the inheritance verse speaks of an indefinite bequest, and the transfer of the bequest to God's own allotment is itself abrogation by the Kitāb; but the lawfulness of bequests to heirs ended only by the sunna, so the argument holds from that angle. Stoning (not strong: ʿUmar says the stoning verse was recited, so it is Kitāb by Kitāb; and the confinement verse was timed by a mujmal, "or God makes a way for them" (Q 4:15), which the Sunna explained, and explaining a mujmal by the Sunna is agreed). Q 60:11 (weak: it was a recommendation, never abrogated). His concession: «فَبِهَذَا تبين أَنه لَا يُؤْخَذ نسخ حكم ثَابت بِالْكتاب بِحكم هُوَ ثَابت بِالسنةِ ابْتِدَاء» (v2/71) — "So it is clear that from these no abrogation of a Kitāb ruling by a ruling the Sunna lays down afresh is derived"; what is derived is the Sunna's addition to a Kitāb ruling (exile with flogging), which for us is abrogation. So our colleagues' examples rest on B11.08; the proof of possibility (Q 16:44) and the Q 33:52 and earlier-law cases stand on their own. (v2/69–72) → B11.08
  • The main proof: "that you explain to people what was sent down to them" (Q 16:44), "to them", not "to you": the ruling reaches people by recited and unrecited revelation (Q 53:3–4), and the Prophet explains the term of a recited ruling by unrecited revelation. If we heard him say "this ruling has ended", we would have to accept it; so too by mass transmission. Both are explanation; the marker is timing: pure explanation may come joined to the speech, abrogation only later. (v2/72–74)
  • Recitation is abrogated without the Kitāb (earlier scriptures; Ubayy's "I thought it was abrogated"); "women are not lawful to you hereafter" (Q 33:52) was abrogated by what is not recited (ʿĀʾisha and Ibn ʿUmar). "Better or like" means reward or ease; abrogation is not tied to inimitability. (v2/75–76)
  • "Compare it with the Book": «فقد قيل هَذَا الحَدِيث لَا يكَاد يَصح» — "it has been said that this ḥadīth is hardly sound", since it contradicts the Book's unqualified command to follow him; if sound, it concerns single reports, or conflict with unknown dates. (v2/76)
  • Objection: the Jerusalem qibla was earlier law, so Kitāb (Q 6:90). Reply: for you earlier law binds us only as it becomes our law through the Sunna; and the Meccan Kaʿba qibla was itself sunna, so Jerusalem was sunna by sunna, then sunna by Kitāb. The earlier law abrogated by the Prophet's word or act is agreed, «وَهَذَا نسخ الْكتاب بِالسنةِ» (v2/77) — "and this is abrogation of the Book by the Sunna". The Sunna by the Kitāb (Q 16:89): Jerusalem as qibla (by sunna) abrogated by Q 2:144; the Ḥudaybiya return clause by Q 60:10; early wine lawfulness; eating after sleep in Ramaḍān (Q 2:187). Kitāb by Kitāb (Q 15:85 → 9:5; Q 8:65 → 8:66); Sunna by Sunna (graves, sacrificial meat, vessels). (v2/76–77)
• Single reports: «فَأَما بِخَبَر الْوَاحِد لَا يجوز النّسخ بعد رَسُول الله» (v2/77) — "After the Messenger, abrogation [of the Book] by a single report is not allowed", «لِأَن التَّعَارُض بِهِ لَا يثبت بَينه وَبَين الْكتاب» (v2/77) — "since conflict between it and the Book is not established by it": it is not known to be his word, so it cannot fix the term of a ruling established by what yields certain knowledge. The criterion: the Kitāb may be abrogated by a mutawātir or mashhūr sunna only where, if the dates were unknown, the two would count as conflicting; a single report cannot conflict with the Kitāb. In his lifetime it was (the people of Qubāʾ). (v2/77–78)

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B11.07 · وجوه النسخ · Recitation and ruling together (only in the Prophet's life); ruling without recitation; recitation without ruling (v2/78–81)

• Recitation and ruling: earlier scriptures (Q 87:18–19); possible in the Prophet's life (Q 87:6–7; Q 17:86). «فَأَما بعد وَفَاة الرَّسُول لَا يجوز هَذَا النَّوْع من النّسخ فِي الْقُرْآن عِنْد الْمُسلمين» — "After the Messenger's death this kind of abrogation in the Qurʾān is not allowed, in the Muslims' view." (v2/78)
• Who: "some heretics hiding behind Islam" allow it after his death (Abū Bakr's "do not turn from your fathers", Anas's "tell our people…", ʿUmar's stoning verse, Ubayy on Sūrat al-Aḥzāb). al-Shāfiʿī, who "is not thought to agree with them", accepted ʿĀʾisha's report of ten sucklings abrogated by five, recited after the Prophet's death. (v2/78–79)
• Reply: "We have sent down the Reminder and We will preserve it" (Q 15:9) means preserved among us. The single reports are anomalous; "in the Book of God" for stoning means "in God's ruling" (Q 4:24). «وَحَدِيث عَائِشَة لَا يكَاد يَصح» (v2/79) — "ʿĀʾisha's ḥadīth is hardly sound": a domestic animal eating the sheet under the bed would not erase it from memory, nor stop them writing it on another sheet; «فَعرفنَا أَنه لَا أصل هَذَا الحَدِيث» (v2/80) — "so we know this ḥadīth has no basis", his own verdict on the report as he recounts it. (v2/79–80)
• The other two kinds: allowed by most, against those who deny both or deny recitation-only abrogation. Ruling abrogated, recitation kept: confinement for zinā (Q 4:15), the year's ʿidda (Q 2:240), the charity before consultation, the fasting choice (Q 2:184); the recitation keeps two aims (prayer, inimitability). Recitation abrogated, ruling kept: consecutive fasting in the oath expiation, from Ibn Masʿūd's reading, well known up to Abū Ḥanīfa: the recitation was removed from hearts in the Prophet's life except Ibn Masʿūd's, so the ruling stays by his report. (v2/80–81) → B7.15
  • Objection (those who allow only ruling-abrogation): removing recitation would mean believing that what was Qurʾān and God's speech is not so. Reply: «لَا نعتقد فِيهِ أَنه لَيْسَ بقرآن وَأَنه لَيْسَ بِكَلَام الله تَعَالَى بِحَال من الْأَحْوَال» (v2/81) — "we do not believe of it, in any state whatever, that it is not Qurʾān or not God's speech"; what ends is only the recitation's legal effects, its sufficiency in prayer and the ban on its recitation by the junub and menstruating woman, since God lifted its recitation and memory from us. Likewise we still believe the Prophet is God's Messenger and the seal of the prophets after his death. (v2/81)

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B11.08 · الزيادة على النص · An addition that changes what suffices under an unqualified text (in God's rights, or any indivisible right) is explanation in form and abrogation in meaning, so it cannot come by a single report or qiyās, against al-Shāfiʿī (v2/82–86)

• Position: «وَأما الْوَجْه الرَّابِع وَهُوَ الزِّيَادَة على النَّص فَإِنَّهُ بَيَان صُورَة وَنسخ معنى عندنَا» — "The fourth kind, addition to the text, is explanation in form and abrogation in meaning, in our view", whether in the cause or the ruling. al-Shāfiʿī: like specifying a general, so allowed by single report and qiyās. Examples: exile with flogging; belief in the expiation slave. (v2/82)
• His case: "raqaba" is general, so excluding the unbeliever specifies; the Israelites' cow was pure explanation; the addition leaves the original ruling in place, as with witnesses to 1,000 and to 1,500. (v2/82)
• Our proof: God's rights (worship, penalty, expiation) are indivisible: one rakʿa of fajr is not fajr; 79 lashes do not bar the slanderer's testimony. Adding exile makes the flogging part of the ḥadd, and a part of a ḥadd is no ḥadd; so it changes the ruling. People's rights differ where divisible: «وَبِه فَارق حُقُوق الْعباد فَإِنَّهُ مِمَّا يحْتَمل الْوَصْف بالتجزي» (v2/83) — "by this it differs from people's rights, since they can be described as divisible", so an addition can confirm what it is added to. Where a people's right is indivisible the rule is the same as for God's rights: an offer alone is no sale, and marrying one or two women does not bring the bar that marrying four does. (v2/83) The qualified is the opposite of the unqualified, so a later qualification ends it. Specification takes out; qualification adds. «أَن النّسخ إِنَّمَا يثبت بِمَا لَو جهل التَّارِيخ فِيهِ كَانَ مُعَارضا» (v2/84) — "abrogation is established only by what would be a conflicting proof if the dates were unknown", and unqualified and qualified texts do conflict when undated. (v2/82–84)
• Furūʿ test: the Fātiḥa is not a pillar; purity is not a condition of ṭawāf; exile is not part of the ḥadd; belief is not required in the oath and ẓihār expiations. Abū Ḥanīfa and Abū Yūsuf: a little of al-ṭilāʾ al-muthallath (a cooked grape drink) is not forbidden, since what the text forbids is intoxication (al-sukr), and a little is only part of the cause. Water too little for wuḍūʾ is not used; one does tayammum. Witnesses to a sale at 1,000 and 1,500 do not prove a sale at 1,000. (v2/84)
• Abrogation of an abrogator: the ransom of captives, as reported from Ibn ʿAbbās (Q 8:67 → 47:4, then al-Suddī: → 9:5); zinā (confinement → "take it from me" → Q 24:2 and the stoning of Māʿiz). (v2/84–85)

• Position (Sarakhsī's preference): inheritance by alliance and emigration (Q 4:33; 8:72) and "kin are nearer to one another in God's Book than the believers and emigrants" (Q 33:6; compare Q 8:75): some call it abrogation, some only preference of one heir over another. «وَالأَصَح أَن نقُول هَذَا نسخ بعض الْأَحْوَال دون الْبَعْض» (v2/85) — "The sounder is to say: this is abrogation in some circumstances, not others": the ally no longer inherits alongside kin, but still inherits where there is none (Ibn Masʿūd to Hamdān). (v2/85–86)

• [Editorial] Debate note (bāb): B11.08 is the Ḥanafī principle behind many famous furūʿ (the Fātiḥa, ṭawāf without wuḍūʾ, exile, the expiation slave): an addition to a text (Kitāb, or a sunna of the same standing) cannot come by a single report or qiyās. Two reports are treated differently. For the "compare with the Book" ḥadīth he only reports a criticism ("it has been said" that it is hardly sound) and then says how it would be read if established. For ʿĀʾisha's suckling report the verdict is his own: hardly sound, indeed without basis. Quote each at its own strength, and check the reports' collection and chains before relying on either in a debate.

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